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1. Introduction:
As a consequence of oil extraction, host communities in resource rich countries are oppressed 
and impoverished people who suffer from the consequences of environmental degradation and 
destruction of livelihoods but share no benefit of its extraction. Furthermore, host communities 
are not regarded as stakeholders that have a say in their development trajectories due to power 
imbalances embedded in a country’s institutional context that are shaped by rent-seeking and 
patronage. The lack of accountability creates an enabling environment for elites to appropriate 
natural resources and increases their political control which leads to repression (McFerson, 2010). 
This paper adopts the term “institutions curse” to refer to an institutional context that causes 
underdevelopment in natural resource rich countries (Menaldo, 2016). It argues that referring to 
underdevelopment in resource rich countries as a “natural resource curse” is inappropriate. This 
is because natural resources are not directly linked to poor development outcomes.  
The institutions curse refers to public sector institutions and it argues that the term explains why 
natural resources are a curse for some countries and a blessing for others (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009a). The important point is that policy and institutional changes are less likely to occur in a 
vacuum (Rosser, 2006). In addition, the institutions curse highlights the power imbalances that 
favour political elites, patrimonial governments and the private sector. Furthermore, it highlights 
the unequal information asymmetries that exist between the elite and the public and that lead to 
corruption.  
Transparency, through global transparency and accountability tools such as the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), has been brought forward by the international 
community as potentially able to mitigate underdevelopment in resource rich countries. These 
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international actors include the Western Donor community that includes North American and 
European governments, Western dominated multi-lateral institutions such as the WB, IMF and 
the G-8 and other global Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
The paper applies Kolstad & Wiig’s (2009a) understanding of impartiality enhancing institutions 
in Nigeria to argue that transparency is not enough for two major reasons. Weak institutions and 
governance, as in the case of Nigeria, are not easily altered by transparency alone. One needs to 
change the incentives of the governing elite by punishing those who benefit from the lack of 
transparency and by supporting agents that advance the interests of communities through civil 
society. In its current format, the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) 
does not have the ability to sanction the behaviour of companies or government officials for 
corruption, human rights violations and environmental degradation. Furthermore, through its 
National Stakeholder Working Group (NSGW), the multi-institutional arrangement of the EITI, 
the NEITI is currently unable to achieve meaningful civil society participation that is likely to 
lead to achieve accountability. This means that the NEITI cannot alter the power dynamics in 
Nigeria’s oil sector and this is reinforced by its institutional context.  
This paper has six chapters. The first chapter will begin with an introduction on the natural 
resource curse literature and how it has evolved over time and shifted its focus on natural 
resources to a country’s institutional context and how this affects underdevelopment. The second 
chapter of the paper will discuss how and why transparency became globally recognized as 
potentially able to mitigate the “natural resource curse”. The third chapter will evaluate the 
history and the impact of the EITI. The fourth chapter will critically analyze the implementation 
of the EITI in Nigeria. Finally the paper will conclude.  
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2. Chapter 1: The Natural Resource Curse or Institutions Curse?  
2.1. An Introduction to the Natural Resource Curse: 
In the early 1960s, development economics was populated by the idea that poor countries must 
experience large windfall revenues to break out of poverty. Prominent development scholars 
such as Walter Rostow argued that natural resource abundance would better facilitate the 
transition from underdevelopment to a process of industrialization (Rosser, 2006). Yet, many 
resource rich countries experienced poor economic performance as compared to resource-poor 
countries (Stevens, 2003).  
The potential negative impacts of resource wealth first emerged among development economists 
in the 1950s and 1960s (Stevens, 2003). This early scholarship of the natural resource curse was 
preoccupied by the need to explain the “paradox of the plenty”, a phenomena  which saw 
countries with abundant resource wealth with poor economic performance, civil war, high levels 
of poverty and authoritarian rule (Sachs & Warner, 1997; 2001; Ross, 1999; Auty, 2000; Rosser, 
2006).  
The natural resource curse is defined as the adverse effects of a country’s natural resource wealth 
on its economic, social or political well-being (Ross, 2015). In 1993, Richard Auty was the first 
to speak of a “natural resource curse” and since then there are many scholars who have attempted 
to explain this phenomena by using a variety of explanations.  
There is consensus that countries with abundant natural resource wealth are outperformed by 
poorly resourced countries. However, there is little agreement on why this is the case (Ross, 
1999). This is especially true for the mining sector (Davis & Tilton, 2005). Scholars question the 
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positive relationship between mineral extraction and economic development that was held by 
neo-classical economists.  
3. Economic Explanations of the Resource Curse: 
Auty (1994) was one of the first scholars that were intrigued by the relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth. This early attempt focused more on industrial and macro-
economic policy as a key variable that can mitigate the resource curse. However, later studies 
about economic growth reveal that natural resources per se do not have a significant impact on 
economic growth (Stijins, 2000).  
In an early attempt to understand the relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth, Sachs and Warner (1999) use the Dutch Disease to explain the natural resource curse. In 
this explanation, the shrinking of the manufacturing sector is the disease (Sachs & Warner, 1999). 
Sachs and Warner (1999) find an inverse association between natural resource abundance and 
economic growth suggesting that there are other mitigating variables that affect economic growth 
(Sachs &Warner, 2001). Furthermore, in their later paper, Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that 
establishing a causal relationship between natural resources and economic growth is as difficult 
as determining what ultimately drives growth. 
Some of the features of the Dutch Disease include a large real appreciation in the currency, an 
increase in spending by government because of the resource windfall, a labour shift away from 
the manufacturing sector, a current account deficit and an increase in non-traded goods relative 
to traded goods (Frankel, 2010). Ultimately, the increase in the prices of non-traded goods leads 
to de-industrialization (Frankel, 2010, Ross, 1999). In addition, the Dutch disease causes 
economic decline because of ailing terms of trade for primary commodities, the instability of 
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international commodity markets and poor economic linkages between the resource and non-
resource sectors (Auty, 1994; Ross, 1999). These early explanations mainly focused on 
economic explanations to understand the natural resource curse. 
Other economic explanations focus on the role of investment and saving to avert the natural 
resource curse (Gyfalson & Zoega, 2001; Paprakis & Gerlagh, 2004). Gyfalson & Zoega (2001) 
argue that natural resource abundance may indirectly negatively affect saving and investment by 
allowing the financial sector to degenerate (Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2009; Van der Ploeg 
and Venables, 2012). They suggest that economic and structural reforms can overcome this 
adverse effect. Moreover, Gyfalson and Zoega (2001) argue that well developed financial 
institutions will encourage savings and investment which will contribute to economic growth. 
They also argue that economic and structural reforms are necessary to achieve efficient capital 
markets, increased investments and a better allocation of capital across all sectors (Gyfalson & 
Zoega, 2001).  
To avoid the natural resource curse, Van der Ploeg and Venables (2012) see an intergenerational 
sovereign wealth fund as one possible solution to protect a resource-rich economy. There are 
many scholars that agree with this assertion including Van der Ploeg (2006). Since natural 
resources are exhaustible and should be shared by future generations as well, Van der Ploeg 
(2006) contends that it only makes sense to create a fund that will allow future generations to 
benefit from it as well. Furthermore, according to Van der Ploeg (2006) another alternative to 
avoid the curse is to use natural resources revenues to reduce government debt and invest in 
education and infrastructure projects. However, Van der Ploeg and Venables (2012) argue that 
the success of managing such a fund will depend on a country’s economic, political and social 
institutions (Van der Ploeg & Venables, 2012).  
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3.1.The Criticism of Economic Explanations:  
Ross (1999) questions existing economic explanations such as the Dutch Disease, which he finds 
are less applicable for developing countries. In refuting the Dutch Disease, he explains that its 
validity is subject to the assumption that a resource rich country’s natural resource sector is 
capable of drawing labour and capital away from the manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
leading to a lack of productivity and export in these sectors. In addition, that this will lead the 
inflation of goods and services that can be imported (Ross, 1999). Ross (1999) questions the 
Dutch Disease because it assumes that an economy’s capital and labour are fixed and fully 
employed before a resource boom. This reality is a very rare in developing countries.  
Furthermore, the Dutch disease assumes that the natural resource curse can be easily averted if 
domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes for import goods which become cheaper when 
the exchange rate appreciates (Ross, 1999). This suggests that policy tools can easily mitigate the 
Dutch Disease but it does not explain why governments do not adopt these relevant policies in 
the first place (Ross, 1999). Ross (1999) further argues that this is the most interesting question 
about the natural resource curse, why states fail to take measures that avert the paradox of the 
plenty. For Ross (1999), the answer can be found in the political explanations of the resource 
curse. 
Stevens (2003) also critiques the Dutch Disease and argues that the Dutch Disease focuses its 
attention on the effects of manufacturing only and this is proof that much of the work on it has 
been concentrated more in developed countries like Norway. Alternatively, Stevens (2003) 
argues that a major part of the natural resource curse should be seen as essentially political and 
Why is Transparency Not Enough to Address the Institutions Curse? 
A Case Study of Nigeria’s Implementation of the EITI. 
Page | 12 
 
relating to the role of government. This strand of literature shifts the focus away from economic 
explanations which dominated the early scholarship.  
3.2.Political Explanations of the Resource Curse:  
According to Ross (1999), when compared to economic explanations of the resource curse, 
political explanations are better able to address why states fail to adopt and maintain 
transparently suboptimal economic policies which are more likely to lead to development. Ross 
(1999) provides three reasons for possible stunted economic growth in natural resource-rich 
countries. These reasons can be grouped into three categories: cognitive explanations, societal 
explanations and state centered explanations. Ross (1999) contends that cognitive explanations 
focus on the short-sightedness among policy-makers to make the best policies that will yield 
development outcomes; societal explanations contend that resource rents only empower certain 
sectors, classes or interest groups that support growth-impeding policies; and state-centered 
explanations focus on the causal relationships between natural resources and state institutions 
Ross (1999) contends that state-centered explanations provide a better explanation for why a 
resource boom produces a decline in the quality of state policies. These explanations are referred 
to as the “rentier state theories” and are the most common version of state-centered approaches 
(Ross, 1999; Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001). Ross (2015) argues that rentier state theories focus on the 
need to tax citizens to achieve accountability by state officials to the societies they govern.  
However, according to the rentier state theory, the need to tax citizens declines the more the state 
begins to rely solely on resource revenues. Barma, Kaiser, Minh Le and Vinuela (2011) contend 
that in short, rents become a political currency as governments become preoccupied in guarding 
the status quo instead of promoting welfare enhancing development. In addition, the rentier state 
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receives very little pressure to improve economic policies because it does not tax citizens. 
Instead it is preoccupied by the constant demand to discourage political opposition (Ross, 1999). 
As a consequence, resource rents also induce patronage behaviour in a constant bid to take over 
the state.  
Theories of the rentier state come in different forms and emphasize different causal links 
between resource rents and poor economic growth. However, despite there being many causal 
links, Ross (1999) emphasizes the work of D. Micheal Shafer (1994) and Terry Lynn Karl (1997) 
which argues that resource abundance tends to weaken state institutions as a result of other 
intervening factors. In this paper, Ross (1999) emphasizes the work of other scholars who argue 
that the leading sector of an economy affects institutions uniquely. This work argues that the 
dependence on petroleum revenues produces a distinctive type of institutional setting which 
becomes weakened and affects the extractive capability of the state (Ross, 1999). However, Ross 
(1999) critiques these early attempts by scholars for their lack of conceptual clarity which make 
their findings difficult to test. This work is one of the earliest attempts to identify institutional 
quality as a possible factor in the resource curse literature.  
In these early studies the relationship between natural resource abundance and institutional 
quality received limited attention (Brunnschweiler, 2008). However, the review of the literature 
suggests that it should have played a more prominent role. For example, studies done by scholars 
such as Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show that institutional quality alone can 
explain a great deal of cross-country differences in economic development. The literature is also 
dominated by debates about the definitions of institutions; which institutions matter; and 
different measures of institutions. The next section explores these debates.  
Why is Transparency Not Enough to Address the Institutions Curse? 
A Case Study of Nigeria’s Implementation of the EITI. 
Page | 14 
 
4. Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse:  
The natural resource literature is also dominated by scholars who see democracy and democratic 
institutions as one possible way to avoid the natural resource curse. The main argument is that 
rising incomes linked to oil wealth causes a decline in democracy (Ross, 2001). Scholars also 
argue that this is particularly the case when oil is extracted onshore as in the Niger Delta in 
Nigeria or offshore as in Angola.  
In one of the most influential papers, Ross (2001) argues that oil wealth tends to make states less 
democratic. Ross (2001) also finds that this claim is statistically valid and robust and provides 
three explanations for why oil hinders democracy: the rentier effect, the repression effect and the 
modernization effect. First, the rentier effect argues that governments use low tax rates to relieve 
pressure from citizens for greater accountability. This argument falls under rentier state theories. 
Second, the repression effect argues that oil revenues are able to provide governments with more 
funding for security and oppression. Finally, the modernization effect holds the view that oil-
dependence is unable to produce cultural and social changes that lead to a democratic 
government. Ross (2001) argues that these effects interact and complement each other and 
eventually lead to authoritarianism.  
Van der Ploeg (2011) highlights the importance of regime types as a possible transmission 
channel of the natural resource curse and adds a different layer to the debate by arguing that 
presidential democracies are more likely to experience the resource curse as compared to 
parliamentary democracies. One can conclude that the constitutional system can also explain 
why the natural resource curse occurs in some resource rich countries (Van der Ploeg, 2011). 
Presidential systems are less accountable and less representative. However, Van der Ploeg (2011) 
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argues that the nature of the constitutional system is more important than democratic rule for the 
relationship between resource dependence and growth.  
Furthermore, Van der Ploeg (2000) also argues that corruption is more prevalent in non-
democratic regimes. This argument indicates that the degree of power distribution may be an 
important contributor to the natural resource curse (Van der Ploeg, 2000; Shaxson, 2007). In 
addition, Van der Ploeg (2000) contends that checks and balances are necessary for averting the 
resource curse.  
Moreover, Van der Ploeg (2000) distinguishes between institutional appropriability and technical 
appropriability. Institutional appropriability implies that resource dependence only has negative 
impact on economic development when institutions are weak. On the other hand, technical 
appropriability implies that the impact of institutional quality and resource dependence is more 
exaggerated the more technically appropriable the country’s resources are. Oil is identified as a 
technical appropriable resource due its extraction process (Boschini, Petterson & Roine, 2007). 
The concept of “appropriability” captures the likelihood that natural resources will lead to rent-
seeking, corruption or conflict thus affecting economic development (Boschini et al., 2007). 
Ultimately, Van der Ploeg (2000) contends that the resource curse depends on institutional 
quality and the type of resource endowment a country has. 
Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) take the argument further by testing the relationship between 
political regimes and natural resource wealth in Africa. They find that natural resources have 
mostly led to economic decline in African petrostates thus reinforcing the argument about the 
importance of the type of resource endowment. The literature is also populated by theories that 
argue that when incomes rise, governments tend to become more democratic. However, these 
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studies also contend that the exception to the rule applies to countries that are rich in oil (Ross, 
2001). This is evidenced by the fact that the living conditions of petro-states are below the 
average of sub-Saharan African countries that have similar income levels.  
In addition, Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) find that African resource-rich countries struggled to 
achieve democratic consolidation after the third wave of democratization. These states are 
Nigeria, Libya, Gabon, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004). 
South Africa and Botswana are the exception and this is evidence that not all resource rich 
countries become undemocratic. They further argue that to avoid the natural resource curse, 
these countries must introduce strong mechanisms of vertical and horizontal accountability 
within the state (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Shaxson, 2007). More specifically, they highlight 
that it is the degree of executive discretion over the distribution of oil rents or mineral revenues 
that causes democratic decline or breeds authoritarian governments (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; 
Shaxson, 2007). 
Similar to early arguments made by Ross (2001), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) emphasize that 
revenues derived from natural resources cause states to become more detached and less 
accountable. However, their argument is more nuanced as they claim that it is the executive 
discretion over resource rents that lead to less political liberalization. Another important nuance 
in Jensen and Wantchekon’s (2004) argument is the importance of transparency in curbing 
executive discretion to redistribute rents productively. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) argue that 
informational advantage by political incumbents leads to a lack of accountability. 
Damania and Bulte (n.d.) also argue that natural resources can have a negative impact on public 
policy and argue that it this is conditional on the political regime type. They also argue that 
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although autocratic regimes are more likely to become rent-seeking, democratic regimes yield 
ambiguous outcomes (Damania & Bulte, n.d.). In democratic regimes, the impact of natural 
resources can lead to a greater struggle during democratic transition and democratic 
consolidation (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004). For example, this can translate into one-party 
dominance such as the one observed in Botswana.  
4.1.The Criticism of Democracy Explanations: 
There are also scholars who critique democracy explanations. For example, Stevens (2003) 
argues that the recommendation to become democratic is misleading because democracy is not a 
condition for economic growth. Furthermore, scholars such as Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) 
critique Ross (2001) for a lack of conceptual clarity on the notion of democracy and state that it 
leads to inconclusive outcomes.  
In addition, Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) argue that early scholarship about oil and democracy 
does not adequately acknowledge the multifaceted nature of democracy as a dependent variable. 
Moreover, they argue that the conclusions about the relationship between oil and democracy do 
not stand the test of time.  
Moreover, Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) also argue that democracy is a highly contested 
concept among political scientists and that it is more important to distinguish between procedural 
democracy and substantive democracy. Procedural democracy emphasizes political rights in the 
form of rules and institutions such as the requirement for free and fair elections. In contrast, 
substantive democracy emphasizes the need for political liberties to ensure that national 
government is accountable to the general citizenry and that each citizen is entitled to participate 
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in government decisions either directly or through an elected representative, is given the right to 
express political opinions and the space for free media.  
Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) contend that most studies about the relationship of resource 
endowment and democracy tend to use a measure of regime type that focuses solely on 
procedural political rights. In addition, Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) conclude that more 
research is needed to determine the relationship between democracy and oil by using both 
indicators of democracy to further test the robustness of prior studies. 
4.2.Corruption and the Natural Resource Curse:  
Other scholars see levels of corruption as an important measure of institutional quality inter alia 
the rule of law and state competence (Damania & Bulte (n.d.); Ross, 2001; Jensen & 
Wantchekon, 2004; Brunnschweiler, 2008). For example, Damania and Bulte (n.d.) use a 
political economy model that focuses on the effects of resource abundance on government-
decision making, corruption and political incentives. The paper by Daminia and Bulte (n.d.) is 
unique in the sense that their conclusions are based on testing a variety of democracy measures. 
They find that the statistical relevance of democracy and its relationship to growth in natural 
resource-rich countries depends on the measure used. Furthermore, they find that the main effect 
of resource abundance on growth occurs through an interaction with political variables (Stevens, 
2003; Rosser, 2006). Moreover, Damania and Bulte (n.d.) argue that although petroleum is likely 
to lead to a curse, this happens indirectly through corruption.  
Shaxson (2007) argues that the over reliance of petrostates on vertical and hierarchal political 
relationships only poses a challenge for political accountability and leads to an increase in 
corruption. Shaxson (2007) defines corruption as the abuse of wider interests by narrow interests 
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and sees democracy as a possible solution. However, Shaxson (2007) argues that the most 
important remedy to combat corruption is the strengthening of both horizontal and vertical 
political relationships to achieve equitable distribution of resource rents in societies.  
The natural resource literature also emphasizes the importance of accountability to combat the 
natural resource curse. As part of the debate about how to achieve accountability, Van der Ploeg 
(2006) recommends that it may be useful to distribute revenues automatically or instantaneously 
directly to citizens. Furthermore, Van der Ploeg (2006) argues that this will allow all citizens to 
get an equal share of natural resource rents and only afterwards can the government tax citizens 
to fund social and economic infrastructure because it is easier to manage resources that come 
from taxes than those that, “fall from heaven like manna” (Van der Ploeg, 2006:31). However, 
van der Ploeg (2001) does not consider what this means in contexts where communities do not 
want mining at all as in the case of Xolobeni in South Africa (Luthango, 2018). Furthermore, 
where environmental degradation and human rights violations occur, sharing the benefits of 
mining economic returns might not mean anything for communities. Nevertheless, Van der 
Ploeg’s (2006) main point is that whether tax collection is done through various other means 
such as through royalties or directly from citizens, it is more important that it is done in an 
accountable and transparent manner.  
5. Natural Resources and Civil War: 
Mineral wealth is also linked to higher risks of civil war and greater inequality (Ross, 2001; 
Shaxson, 2007). The scholarship on the relationship between natural resource abundance and 
civil war distinguishes between the onset of civil war and the duration of civil war (Ross, 2004; 
Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006). There is some literature that also focuses on civil conflict 
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intensity and resource dependence but only a few scholars have discussed this relationship 
further (Ross, 2004). Furthermore, in another study, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that natural 
resource dependence is more likely to lead to separatist civil war. Ross (2004) also reinforces 
this assertion and argues that resources play a different role in separatist conflicts than they do in 
non-separatist conflicts. The civil war literature is divided into economic explanations and 
political explanations. Economic explanations of civil war link low-economic growth and low-
income levels with natural resources. In contrast, political explanations argue that civil war is an 
outcome of weak institutions in resource rich countries (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Humphreys, 
2005).  
The civil war literature mostly argues that in resource abundant countries, rebel leaders out-
compete ideological leaders and this is called the grievance approach (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). 
By using micro-level evidence on rebel organisation, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue that rent-
seeking governments in resource rich countries produce grievance rebellion which is later 
crowded out by opportunistic rebellion and that this is mostly caused by their proneness to 
shocks (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005).  
Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) also agree with Ross (2001) and contend that the risk 
in primary commodities is confined to oil due to the amount of rents it produces. One can then 
conclude that resource rents as distinct from natural resources have an important effect on 
conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) further argue that the established causal mechanism is via 
governance onto long term growth rate and this implies that the relationship between natural 
resources and civil war is an indirect one. However, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue that 
resource rents will not inevitably lead to civil conflict or low-income growth but it depends 
mostly on whether the resource rents are used to finance patronage which reduces the need for 
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taxation to effectively undermine checks and balances. One can conclude that the need for 
checks and balances is a recurring theme in the natural resource literature. 
The debate about democracy is also relevant in the civil-war literature. In an autocratic regime, 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) contend that the office time horizon will likely cause irrational 
looting that is based upon a narrow ethnic minority that is in power. In contrast, in a democratic 
society, the nature of democracy will determine the balance between electoral elements of 
democracy and due processes in the form of checks and balances.  
Scholars such as Humphreys (2005) also use the grievance approach and argue that to limit 
grievances induced by extraction one must regulate corporate practices. For example, through 
corporate participation in voluntary mechanisms. Moreover, governments can also reduce 
grievances that are associated with natural resources by providing the public with better access to 
information about how and where revenue is earned and spent. Humphreys (2005) also contends 
that oversight from civil society over expenditures may also be necessary. From a policy point of 
view, Humphreys (2005) suggests that the EITI is an example of an initiative that can possibly 
mitigate mining related grievances.  
In light of this argument, Le Billion (2001) also confirm that natural resources do not necessarily 
lead to civil conflict but they increase the vulnerability of countries to it by weakening the ability 
of political constitutions to peacefully resolve conflicts. Furthermore, that resource dependence 
can be a historical outcome associated with the global economy, through colonization, private 
trans-border commercial interests and domestic elites.  
Le Billion (2001) also acknowledges the negative impact that resource rents can have on 
accountability, thus reinforcing the grievance rebellion hypothesis by Collier and Hoeffler (2005). 
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Similar to Collier and Hoeffler (2005) he contends that resource-rich countries tend to have 
predatory governments serving sectional interests therefore face a higher risk of violent conflict 
(Le Billion, 2001). Moreover countries with horizontal inequalities along ethnicity, race, class or 
religion face a higher risk of conflict. This risk is acerbated by biased institutional structures 
which are defined by corruption, clientelism and patrimonialism and the political distribution of 
resources.  
Le Billion (2001) also adds an important element to the debate about civil conflict- the 
importance of geographical location of natural resources. Depending on geographical 
concentration, resources are divided into diffuse and point resources (Le Billion, 2001; Ross, 
2004). The latter is concentrated in one particular region and mostly includes resources exploited 
through mining. In contrast, diffuse resources are more widely spread and include productive 
industries like agriculture and fishing. Most of the resource literature agrees that point resources 
pose a greater threat for negative development outcomes including civil war.  
Moreover, according to Boschini et al. (2012) point resources are characterized by being more 
centrally controlled. Hence, the fight to control, transform and distribute benefits and 
externalities of point resources increases the risk of violent outcomes (Le Billion, 2005).  
5.1.Criticism of Natural Resources and Civil War:  
Several scholars have critiqued Hoeffler and Collier (2005). Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that 
Hoeffler and Collier’s (2005) findings appear fragile and that there is no significant relationship 
between civil war and natural resource dependence. Moreover, that there is no significant 
relationship between natural resource dependence and the duration of civil war (Ross, 2004). 
According to Ross (2004) these critiques are based on the fact that the civil war variable appears 
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robust only when one uses Collier and Hoeffler’s (2005) list of civil wars. Other scholars have 
attempted to replicate the study using different versions of their database and found no 
significant correlation between primary commodities and violent conflict.  
In his later study, Ross (2006) finds that exogenous measures of oil, gas and diamonds leads to 
the onset of civil war. Ross (2006) further argues that there are three different mechanisms by 
which oil and diamonds lead to civil war. However that the only robust variable linked to 
conflict duration is contraband. In contrast, Humphreys (2005) argues that conflicts in resource-
rich countries end quicker because they are more likely to end with a military victory of one side 
rather than a negotiated settlement. 
Furthermore, in a later study, Ross (2006) revokes the strong link between oil and civil war and 
argues that the use of “resource exports to GDP” as a variable for resource wealth is flawed 
because civil wars may be the cause of resource dependence or both civil war and resource 
dependence may be caused by a third variable (Ross, 2006). This creates a problem for 
robustness and a failure to determine casual mechanisms between oil and civil war.  
Ross (2006) concludes that minerals lead to civil war because the incentive for independence for 
resource-rich regions increases; trade shocks that may trigger both national and separatist 
conflicts; and that there is at least one mechanism that links oil and diamond civil war. Ross 
(2006) further emphasizes that the causal mechanism between oil and civil war is so rare, that it 
should make one very modest in claiming a resource-conflict link. Moreover, Ross (2006) argues 
that rather, the link between natural resources and civil conflict applies more for lootable 
resources such as diamonds, gemstones and contraband (Ross, 2004; Ross, 2006). One can 
conclude that the likelihood of oil directly causing civil-war is unlikely.  
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Another critique of the natural resource dependence and civil conflict relationship is leveled by 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) who argue that conflict increases dependence on natural 
resources. Moreover, that natural resource abundance reduces the onset of civil wars and that 
there is no need to link resource dependence to civil wars or low-economic growth. 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) conclude that natural resources reduce the risk of conflict via 
an income effect.  
Scholars such as Hodler (2005) also argue that the income effect is especially important in 
factionalized societies because when incomes are lower the risk of civil conflict is higher than it 
is in homogenous societies.  
5.2.Is it an Institutions Curse? 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006a) contend that differences in institutional contexts can 
explain the divergent impact of natural resources where economic and political explanations 
cannot. This argument refutes earlier claims made by scholars such Sachs and Warner (1995) 
who argue that institutional arrangements do not affect economic growth and do not play a 
decisive role in the resource curse. 
The “institutions” literature is divided into three strands that use different measures of 
institutions and political indictors to explain this relationship. The first strand argues that the 
quality of institutions is negatively affected by an abundance of natural resources (Mehlum et al., 
2006a). This relationship denotes an intermediate causal link between natural resources and 
economic growth. It argues that natural resources lead to institutional decay that allows efficient 
or effective plunder of the state for private purposes by leaders (Mehlum et al., 2006a). In the 
second strand, institutions do not play an important role (Mehlum et al., 2006a). This strand of 
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literature sees institutions as neutral, instead the resource curse is an intermediate causal link. For 
example, the Dutch Disease is seen to lead to low economic growth but not to natural resources 
directly. Finally, the third strand argues that the natural resource curse occurs when institutions 
are “good” and another where institutions are “bad”. In this strand, natural resources test 
institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006a). Natural resources do not necessarily cause institutional decay 
but depend on whether or not natural resource rents are allocated productively or not.  
Furthermore, whether the rents are allocated productively or not depends on the quality of 
institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006a). Mehlum et al. (2006a) apply the rent-seeking theory and 
argue that when institutions are bad, dysfunctional democracies invite political rent appropriation; 
low transparency invites bureaucratic corruption; weak protection of property rights; weak 
protection of citizen rights, weak rule of law and warlordism. The term “grabber friendly” 
institutions is used to describe the latter institutional setting ((Mehlum et al., 2006a).  
Scholars support the argument made by Mehlum et al. (2006a) about the role of institutions in 
the natural resource political economy. Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006) argue that countries 
that have institutions that promote accountability and state competence are more likely to benefit 
the most from a resource boom.  
Moreover, Robinson et al. (2006) argue that political institutions are the most relevant 
institutions to promote accountability. This means that whilst some scholars see financial 
institutions as equally important to address the natural curse, political institutions are more 
relevant for promoting accountability from public officials (Gyfalson & Zoega, 2001; Van der 
Ploeg & Venables; 2012). Robinson et al. (2006) criticize previous studies for focusing purely on 
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economic impacts of natural resources which focus on financial institutions. In addition, they 
criticize apolitical explanations about rent-seeking. 
Furthermore, Robinson et al. (2006) argue that countries that develop political institutions and 
state competence are more likely to benefit from resource booms and that this explains why for 
every Venezuela and Nigeria there is a Norway and Botswana. In addition, that any robust 
political model should be able to address why some resources induce prosperity in some 
countries but not others (Robinson et al., 2006). Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006b) introduce 
the terms “growth losers” and “growth winners” to distinguish between countries’ institutional 
arrangements.  
In light of this argument, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) rebut the early dominant consensus 
about resource dependence leading to a natural resource curse. Instead, they also argue that 
natural resource dependence is an outcome of the institutional setting and that the natural 
resource curse may be a red herring because a bulk of the empirics use a measure of resource 
dependence to denote resource abundance (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009). 
Furthermore, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) argue that resource abundance is actually 
correlated with strong institutions and rapid growth. They conclude that studies should 
distinguish between resource abundance which is the stock measure of in situ of resource wealth; 
resource rents, which is the revenue derived from resource stock; and resource dependence, 
which is the degree to which countries have diverse sources of income or not. For example, 
resources in the ground have been found by some scholars to not pose the same threat for 
institutional quality or economic performance as flows of resource rents do (Brunnschweiler & 
Bulte, 2007). 
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Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) contend that the causality is from institutions to dependence; 
countries with poor institutions are unlikely to diversify their economies. Using this logic, 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) conclude that one cannot imply that there is a “curse of 
resources” but possibly what Victor Menaldo (2016) refers to as the “the institutions curse”.   
Menaldo (2016) uses an economic framework to describe the institutions curse. It focuses more 
on the management of macroeconomic institutions and fiscal policy to achieve economic and 
political development (Lawera, Lukas & Jørgensen, 2017). Additionally, Menaldo (2016) 
highlights credibility problems in fulfilling contractual obligations and high transaction costs for 
political incumbents as important facets of the institutions curse. Property rights and state 
capacity are highlighted as key institutions that enable economic development.  
Whilst Menaldo’s (2006) explanation of the institutions curse is mostly economic, this paper 
argues that it can also be applied to refer to public institutions too. For example, while the Dutch 
Disease adopts a more economic explanation of institutions, it can be contrasted with what 
Williams (2011:490) refers to as the “Nigerian Disease”. The Nigerian Disease argues that the 
natural resource curse is caused by governments who fail to effectively manage natural resource 
revenue (Williams, 2011). Over the years, corruption in the form of rent-seeking and patronage 
have become predominant explanations of the natural resource curse (Williams, 2009). In the 
same vein, this paper also speaks of an institutions curse.  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) reinforce the argument made by scholars such as Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2007). Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) argue that political economy models which focus on 
how certain resource rents lead to dysfunctional patronage or rent-seeking behavior are central to 
understanding the causes of the resource curse. They contribute to this literature by introducing 
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the concept of “impartiality enhancing institutions” as the key to neutralizing the adverse effects 
of resource rents.  
Impartiality enhancing institutions are defined as institutions  that  reduce the possibility or 
attraction of favouritism. Furthermore, institutions that act in the interest of the public rather than 
those that increase the power of political elites (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a).  Kolstad and Wiig 
(2009a) see institutions as an equilibrium outcome of repeated interactions of agents. They argue 
that minor reforms to institutions will not be a sustainable solution to bad institutional 
equilibrium because local elites will have incentives to revert back to the status quo.  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) further distinguish between two types of impartiality enhancing 
institutions. One type are functioning institutions of democratic accountability and rule of law 
which limit the extent to which government can obtain its power through patronage and rent-
seeking. The other type are institutions of private sector efficiency. By applying North’s (1990) 
definition of institutions, the rules of the game, Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) argue that impartiality 
enhancing institutions refer to the rules that advance impartiality.  
Furthermore, Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) argue that impartiality enhancing institutions are 
especially important in resource rich countries where policies and laws are often skewed towards 
the interests of governing elites. Moreover, that impartiality can provide a focal point for policy 
makers interested to improve the interventions which further encourage power and representation 
to become more uneven in resource rich countries. One can conclude that the fair representation 
of  power is central for the impartiality enhancing institutions theory.  
For example, Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) argue that capacity building initiatives that are supported 
by international organizations and aimed at strengthening the bureaucracy are likely to become 
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particularistic because they are created and directed by patrimonial governments. Furthermore, 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) argue that attempts to impose Western institutions to other societies 
have mostly failed because their maintenance may not be in the interest of elites. Consequently, 
local elites either resist reform passively or actively.  
Moreover, Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) argue that a more sustainable solution is to encourage local 
elites to develop minimum standards for democratic accountability by encouraging the evolution 
of institutions and ultimately changing the underlying incentives of institutions. However, since 
institutions are difficult to alter, incremental change will not have any significant impact in how 
they function.  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) therefore argue that institutional change, to alter power imbalances in 
a bad institutional context,  is more likely to be achieved if the incentives of those who benefit 
from the lack of transparency are punished (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a). They suggest that technical 
solutions to weak governance and institutions will not be enough and that sanctions must be 
imposed on those who benefit from opaque transparency and the lack of accountability with an 
end goal of improving institutions (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a).  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) further argue that what is needed are interventions that raise the voice 
and influence of those who are not included in decision making processes about how resource 
revenues should be spent. And, to achieve impartiality enhancing institutions, there is a need to 
support agents such as independent NGOs and other organizations that can advance the plight of 
impoverished and disenfranchised citizens through selective interventions that can increase the 
influence of agents to counter-balance the power of patrimonial governments (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009a).  
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Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) also argue that the concept of impartiality enhancing institutions 
recasts the natural resource curse as a political and social problem instead of seeing it as a purely 
technical one. Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) conclude that Sachs and Warner (1995) should not have 
titled their work, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic growth”. Similar to 
Brunnschweile and Bulte (2007), they argue that it is not empirically appropriate to speak of the 
curse of natural resource curse per se because it is more about management of resource rents.   
In support of Kolstad and Wiig (2009a), Naazneen (2010) argues that it is important to tailor 
interventions according to a country’s specific context, institutional arrangements and local 
variation. Against this background, Nazneen (2010) argues that there is a need to identify factors 
that increase inclusiveness by incorporating more political, social and economic groups into 
decision making that will lead to a more accountable state that will orient rent allocation toward 
collective welfare (Naazneen, 2010). The paper therefore agrees with Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) 
and will test the robustness of their theory about the need for impartiality enhancing institutions 
in countries that have an institutions curse.  
Criticism of the Institutions Curse: 
The institutions literature is also dominated by debates about appropriate measures of institutions. 
Scholars use different measures of institutional quality and hence they have been criticized for 
not being clear about what “institutional quality” entails (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008). For 
example, Boschini et al. (2012) use the Polity IV measure of democracy which reflects the 
presence of institutions and procedures that can allow citizens to express preference about 
alternative policies and leaders; the presence of institutional limits to the powers of the executive; 
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and the guarantee of civil liberties. Other institutional measures include that of Acemoglu (2005) 
who uses property rights to mean the rules and regulations that govern contracts between citizens.  
Furthermore, the institutions literature has also been criticized for not being clear about which 
institutions should be improved (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008). Some scholars argue that 
democratic institutions are more important to reverse the natural resource curse (Bulte, Damania 
& Deacon, 2005). They argue that the effect of resource rents on corruption depends on the 
quality of democratic institutions and the level of democracy (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010; 
Boschini et al., 2012). The evidence from the resource curse literature suggests that institutional 
reform will be a necessary condition for countries to avert underdevelopment.  
This paper addresses these critiques and argues that impartiality enhancing institutions matter 
most to address the institutions curse. Impartiality enhancing institutions aim to mitigate the 
institutions curse through sanctioning those who benefit from opaque transparency and they aim 
to bolster underrepresented people in key decision making structures through civil society 
support and community representation.  
Others critiques of the institutions curse remain unexplored. Stevens and Dietsche (2008) argue 
that that there is a risk that subjective assessments of what good institutions are will be based 
more on ideological perspectives than on scientific knowledge. For example, evidence in the 
literature indicates that resource rich autocracies outperform democracies but the literature is still 
populated by suggestions that democracy is important for checks and balances and electoral 
competition (Collier & Hoeffler, 2006). This is why this paper does not attempt to offer solutions 
for the institutions curse that are based on ideology. 
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Another critique advanced by Stevens and Dietsche (2008) is the concern about the process of 
institutional change, under what conditions do institutions change and why do bad institutions 
persist? Stevens and Dietsche (2008) argue that it is not clear under what conditions a country 
changes its institutions, for example, from being predatory to being developmental. In addition, 
they argue that the chances for positive institutional change are lower in countries where vertical 
relationships and resource rents are captured by narrow elites.  
Hence, the paper understands that institutions are stubbornly persistent (North, 1990). It argues 
that where institutional changes are proposed, they are mostly likely to be incremental and this 
means that where institutions are characterized by bad equilibrium, they will mostly likely revert 
to their original equilibrium especially if local elites do not buy in them completely (Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2009a).  
6. Chapter 2: Transparency and The Institutions Curse: Why Transparency Became a 
Globalized Norm?  
6.1.Why is Transparency Important?  
There is consensus in the literature that good enough institutions will eliminate the resource 
curse which will now be referred to as the institutions curse (Haufler, 2010). One of the most 
recommended policy prescriptions for ameliorating the institutions curse is a need for 
transparency and accountability (William, 2011). The underlying assumption is that information 
empowers citizens to hold public officials accountable (Kosack & Fung, 2014). Transparency is 
also seen as important to shed light on public revenues, public expenditures, awarding of 
contracts, public procurement, ownership interests of public officials, awarding of promotions 
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and key positions in the public sector and the regulation and facilitation of private sector 
activities (Kolstad &Wiig, 2009b). 
In democratic theory, there has been a revival of deliberative democracy which emphasizes 
publicity and debate as central to political decision making (Lindstedt & Nauren, 2010). 
Furthermore, in democratic societies, transparency is considered a human right to allow people 
to be informed about the actions of government and to partake in decision making (Bellver & 
Kaufmann, 2005).  
Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) contend that transparency is also important for human 
development. They argue that it provides incentives for redistribution and inclusiveness by 
ensuring that resources are efficiently managed and not captured by the elite. In the same vein, 
Gillies and Heuty (2011) argue that transparency is also seen as able to bring about change, 
mitigate resource-driven conflict, facilitate development, reduce poverty and improve state-
society relations. By contrast, in predatory states, transparency reforms are seen as likely to be 
resisted and challenged. In these cases, building alliances with potential beneficiaries of 
transparency and civil society is important (Belver & Kaufmann, 2005).  
Much of the literature on transparency focuses on the role of transparency in preventing financial 
crises and in monetary policy-making. It thus focuses on economic explanation of the institutions 
curse. In economics, the lack of information is mostly associated with market failures (Bellver & 
Kaufmann, 2005). This is referred to as economic transparency. This is because transparency can 
also encourage investment and reduce the cost of borrowing. For example, when Nigeria began 
implementing the EITI, its yields above U.S. Treasury bonds dropped from 13% to 6.97% 
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between the years 2002 and continued to do so by the year 2006 as well (Gillies & Heuty, 2011). 
In addition, transparency also affects the borrowing costs of a country (Gillies & Heuty, 2011).  
Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) argue that it is only until recently that more attention about 
informational asymmetries in political markets and the role of transparency in improving public 
services received attention through the realization of Freedom of Information Laws. This is 
referred to as political transparency and it is the focus of this paper.  
Therefore, disclosure and transparency initiatives were developed to address the lack of 
transparency. These initiatives originate from environmental disclosure programs and to some 
extent they have influenced the rise of transparency initiatives (Gupta, 2010; Mol, 2010). They 
are generally seen as less costly governance or institutional reforms. Due to social demand, 
voluntary disclosure in particular has also been growing (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005; Haufler, 
2010). The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Kimberly Certification 
Process (KCP) and the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) are all examples of transparency 
initiatives.  
6.2.Definition of Transparency: 
Transparency has a variety of meanings and there is no agreed upon definition. Conceptual 
clarity is thus needed when using the term (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005; Kosack & Fung 2014). 
Some international organizations define it as ensuring public access to information. In another 
definition by Florini (1999) transparency is seen as the release of information by institutions that 
is relevant to assess those institutions. In this definition, transparency is seen as a mechanism to 
evaluate and assess public institutions to account for their performance. Moreover, the public 
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must be able to interrogate the information provided and use it to hold institutions accountable 
(Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009b) define transparency as the public access to economic, social and 
political information that is timely, reliable and accessible to all stakeholders. Similarly, Gillies 
and Heuty (2011) define transparency as the public disclosure of information in accessible 
formats. A much broader definition of transparency is defined by Sun Kim et al. (2005:649 in 
Gaventa and McGee, 2010:13) as  
“an openness of the governance system through clear processes and procedures and easy 
access to public information for citizens [stimulating] ethical awareness in public service 
through information sharing, which ultimately ensures accountability for the performance 
of the individuals and organizations handling resources or holding public office”.   
When applying a broad definition of transparency one can assume that transparency is necessary 
because it leads to accountability (Gaventa & McGee, 2010).  
Whilst there is some consensus about the definition of transparency in the literature, Bellver and 
Kaufmann (2005) contend that there is gap of conceptual contributions and there is limited 
progress on its measurement and empirical analysis. The impact of transparency is also difficult 
to measure (Gillies & Heuty). In addition, the transparency literature is plagued by 
methodological challenges that prevent measurement accuracy. It is thus difficult to establish a 
causal relationship between information disclosure and development outcomes (Gillies & Heuty, 
2011). Furthermore, evidence from the literature also suggests that transparency cannot directly 
affect governance.  
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Gillies and Heuty (2011) contend that the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship arises 
because the literature often confuses the measurement of impact and effectiveness. The other 
common challenge for measurement is sampling because it is difficult to compare countries that 
subscribe to transparency initiatives with those that do not (Gillies & Heuty, 2011). Furthermore, 
there are also challenges regarding time consistencies because when examining the impact of 
TAIs using indices, one needs sufficient time to make conclusions.  
Additionally, the biggest challenge relates to attribution (Gillies & Heuty, 2011). Transparency is 
mostly accompanied by other reforms which can represent potential impacts and provide other 
explanatory variables. So it is difficult to attribute governance or corruption improvements to 
transparency. This makes it difficult to avoid endogeneity problems (Gillies & Heuty, 2011).  
6.3.The Theoretical Relationship Between the Natural Resource Curse and Transparency:  
According to Williams (2009), where transparency exists, accountability can be achieved and 
natural resources can be a blessing. In contrast, where accountability does not exist, natural 
resources are a curse because there is no effective mechanisms to monitor the actions of  
government (Williams, 2009). Williams (2009) argues that the lack of transparency is one of the 
primary reasons for poor economic growth and not natural resources per se.  
The principal-agent framework is widely used both by economists and political scientists in the 
literature to explain information asymmetries (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). In these principal 
agent situations, the principal has the right to know about the agent’s behaviour. In politics, the 
principal refers to the general public and the agent is government or international organizations 
(Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005). This framework articulates a social contract that confers power to 
the executive by citizens, who are in turn in a position to demand accountability. 
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Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) contend that this relationship lies at the core of the development 
process. Furthermore, that imperfect information causes agency problems between those 
governing and those that they are supposed to serve, making it difficult for the principal to 
control the agent. In the natural resource value chain, transparency and the dissemination of 
information is important to allow different social groups to participate in the decision-making 
process (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005).  
Transparency is usually subject to severe resistance because it confers power to certain groups in 
the arrangement (Meijer, 2012). Power can be used to both limit and increase transparency. 
Transparency is therefore seen as a powerful mechanism to increase the bargaining power of the 
electorate. It is a means that will see legislatures, the media and civil society better empowered to 
hold the executive to account about policies, practices and expenditures (Bellver & Kaufmann, 
2005).  
This is especially relevant in the extractive sector that is usually characterized by strong 
asymmetries of information. Its governance features informational enclaves where questionable 
policies and corruption tend to thrive (Gillies & Heuty, 2011). Gillies and Heuty (2011) refer to 
this as an uneven allocation of power that reflects the centralization of power due to rents. They 
argue that, “concentrations of information accompany concentration of power” and this is 
important to understand principal-agent problems (Gillies & Heuty, 2011:31). In different 
scenarios, the principal and agent can change. But in the case of a “natural resource curse”, the 
principal is a citizen and the agent is government who is expected to act on behalf of the 
principal’s interest through elections (Williams, 2009).  
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According to Haulfer (2010) the information that is worth disclosing in the extractive industry to 
avoid corruption are the details of the call for proposals and the bidding; the terms and conditions 
of contracts; revenue flows between companies and governments in the form of taxes, royalties, 
signing bonuses and fees; pricing decisions; the size and location of reserves; exploration and 
development and government budgets for distributing resource rents. Haufler (2010) also argues 
that transparency is important to ensure that communities are also informed before any extractive 
activity. For example, this is articulated well by the call for, “free, prior, continuous and 
informed consent” by NGO campaigns in South Africa (International Commission of Jurists, 
2018).  
6.4.The Relationship Between Transparency and Corruption: 
Corruption is defined by Kolstad and Wiig (2009b) as the abuse of public office for private gain. 
Although corruption is also subject to conceptual contestation, for the purposes of this paper, 
political corruption is more relevant. Kolstad and Søreide (2009:214) contend that, “…corruption 
is the main development problem in resource-rich countries”.  
Political corruption is defined as the abuse of public office by those who make the rules of the 
game (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009b). There is a consensus in the literature that the lack of 
transparency makes corruption less risky and it makes it difficult to apply incentives to make 
public officials act according to the rules and to select professional bureaucrats based on merit. It 
also leads to informational advantages that allow easier access to rents and make reform more 
difficult to achieve. Civic cooperation is also less likely to be achieved and sustained. 
Furthermore, the lack of transparency undermines social norms and levels of trust between a 
principal and an agent (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009b).  
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However, according to Kolstad and Wiig (2009b), the role of corruption in reducing the 
“resource curse” is poorly articulated and understood. Kolstad and Wiig (2009b) argue that 
transparency is not sufficient to ameliorate the “resource curse” and should be complemented by 
other policies. Furthermore, that although there is correlation between high levels of corruption 
and a lack of transparency, this does not imply that a causal relationship exists. Lindstedt and 
Nauren (2010) confirm this and argue that there are certain preconditions that need to be met 
alongside transparency reforms (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010).  
6.5.Transparency is Not Enough: 
There is consensus in the literature that transparency is not sufficient to curb the institutions 
curse (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009a; Carter, 2014). This implies that transparency is conditional. 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009b) contend that one needs the ability to process the information and 
incentives to act on the processed information as one condition of transparency. Education is also 
identified as an important precondition for the ability of people to process information. Lindstedt 
and Nauren (2010) contend that it can be assumed that the higher the education level, the 
stronger the capacity of people to access and understand information.  
Other important conditions of transparency include the ability of other agents to hold public 
officials to account, freedom of the press in democracies and the type of information that is 
provided (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009b). Whistle blower institutions in the form independent oversight 
bodies that encourage public officials to impart information are also important (Bellver & 
Kaufmann, 2005; Lindstedt & Nauren, 2010). In addition, a capacitated civil society is also 
integral (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005). Such capacity is both financial and political.  
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Furthermore, the enactment of laws that can institutionalize transparency is also seen as 
important to ensure that a transparent institutional framework is embedded into the system so 
that it is not subjected to the discretion of different governments (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005). 
Moreover, political transparency is more effective where there already is some degree of political 
competition (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005).  
Beyond this, Gillies and Heuty (2011) argue that a country’s structural context also matters for 
transparency reforms. This includes a country’s political and governance environments as 
exogenous explanatory variables. For example, power relations, the social contract or political 
will. For example, in the case of political will, they argue that transparency can affect political 
will and political will is impacted by transparency.  
Additionally, Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) argue that transparency must be accompanied by the 
“accountability and publicity condition” and that in fact, accountability is primarily a function of 
publicity more than it is about transparency. Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) contrast transparency 
and publicity to explain the relationship between transparency and corruption. They define 
transparency as a concept that largely captures the accessibility of information that makes it 
possible for outsiders to acquire information that will lead to the forming of opinions, actions and 
processes (Lindstedt & Nauren, 2010).  
In contrast, publicity enables information to be communicated to and received by the principal. 
In the relationship between politicians and citizens, transparency implies that documentation 
about key information about politicians and their actions is available to citizens and publicity 
enables the content of this information to be made known by citizens (Lindstedt & Nauren, 2010). 
They conclude that transparency increases the chances of publicity and that if left under exposed, 
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there is no automatic link to publicity. In the case where there is lack of demand and information 
is only targeted to a specialized audience, the chances of information being publicized are less 
and so are the chances of achieving accountability (Lindstedt & Nauren, 2010).  
Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) further argue that mediators in the form of civil society are 
important for publicizing information. Mediators include mass media and non-government 
organizations that have the ability to process information for easier public consumption in the 
form of newspapers, radio or television.  
However, Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) argue that the effectiveness of mediators such as the 
media will be limited if it is corrupt and not able to report without fear or favour of political 
elites. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations are sometimes subject to collective action 
problems when they only represent a few people. These underlying conditions contribute to 
make information costly obtained and not “costlessly obtained” as envisioned (Lindstedt & 
Nauren, 2010:304).  
Moreover, Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) argue that although publicity is an important intervening 
variable for transparency to lead to accountability, it is also not a sufficient one. In this regard, 
Carter (2014) contends that activities to strengthen citizen capabilities to access information 
through communication campaigns and the likes are important. Furthermore that this is 
necessary to bridge data inequalities that arise in the form of class, race, gender, education and 
geography.  
Heald (2012) provides another condition for transparency to be effective and argues that it also 
depends much on whether transparency is about events or a process. It is important to be 
transparent about decisions as early as possible to encourage proactive rather reactive 
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transparency on the part of government. Heald (2012) also underscores the importance of context 
and the underlying power relationships between those who demand transparency and those who 
are asked to provide it.  
Miejer (2012) underscores the importance of context and argues that a culture of secrecy can also 
be deeply rooted in historical traditions and traditional state-society relations. This is mainly 
because institutional rules are a result of historical trajectories. This thinking also applies to 
bureaucratic structures which have a culture of secrecy. Miejer (2012) therefore concludes that 
changes in transparency will have an impact on institutional rules and vice versa. In light of this, 
Miejer (2012) argues that transparency is thus a value of its own that is not exclusive to the 
domain of democratic governance. This has implications about the potential value of 
transparency in non-democratic and semi-democratic countries. Similarly, Al Faraque (2006) 
also argues that the governance structure, institutional setting and political culture are the 
bedrock of accountability.  
Furthermore, Al Faraque (2006) distinguishes between soft and hard law. The latter focuses on a 
mandatory approach to disclosure and the former focuses on a voluntary approach. Al Faraque 
(2006) contends that for disclosure requirements to be effective, they should be incorporated in 
the relevant laws of a country. In addition, that the use of soft law gives companies and 
governments the choice to negate or accept transparency requirements and that this can be 
problematic (Al Faraque, 2006).  
The decentralization of revenue management in the extractive sector is also an important 
governance structure that can contribute to the achievement of accountability. This means that 
government must be transparent to local communities and include them throughout the decision 
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making of the value chain including the bidding and licensing process (Al Faraque, 2006). In 
light of this, Gaventa and McGee (2010) distinguish between upstream and downstream 
transparency to describe transparency at the macro and micro level. They argue that the lack of 
transparency during the bidding process can have negative implications for subsequent lack of 
accountability in the production and revenue allocations because secretly granting contracts 
reinforces the need for confidentiality clauses (Gaventa & McGee, 2010).  
Furthermore, Gaventa and McGee (2010) also distinguish between ex ante accountability and ex 
post accountability. The latter occurs when rules, processes and plans are made transparent in 
advance and the former refers to accountability that occurs after the fact. They call for an 
improvement in ex ante accountability that should allow transparency to take place early in the 
value chain. 
Other scholars such as Ofori and Lujala (2015) distinguish between information disclosure and 
transparency to explain that disclosure of information is not enough to achieve accountability 
because disclosure focuses on a narrow view of transparency. They also further distinguish 
between effective transparency and nominal transparency to underscore that if citizens cannot 
access and understand information, it is of little value to them (Ofori and Lujala, 2015). Effective 
transparency ensures that those who consume the information are able to process the information 
and subsequently base their actions on the information. On the other hand, nominal transparency 
makes information available that is not useful and hence does not ameliorate information 
asymmetries (Ofori and Lujala, 2015). They describe the gap between effective and nominal 
transparency as an illusion of transparency.  
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For example, the success of the Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (GHETI) was 
hindered by highly technical English which concealed information through the use of difficult 
vocabulary (Ofori and Lujala, 2015). Ultimately this presented itself as illusory transparency. 
Ofori and Lujala (2015) contend that the prospects of illusory transparency are a real possibility 
because while government actors consider themselves as being transparency, it is quite a 
common phenomenon for extractive affected communities to lack the access to such information.  
Ofori and Lujala (2015) recommend that transparency reforms take a more holistic approach to 
achieve accountability by looking beyond the supply side of information to address demand 
challenges. Furthermore, that this calls for a more nuanced information-disclosure agenda at the 
local level.  
6.6.The Relationship Between Transparency and Accountability:  
Similar to transparency, accountability is also a concept that dominates the political science 
literature. Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) contend that transparency is closely related to 
accountability and that the purpose for demanding transparency is to allow citizens, markets, and 
governments to hold institutions accountable for their actions.  However, Gaventa and McGee 
(2010) argue that defining accountability is a difficult endeavour and that the relationship 
between transparency and accountability is a poorly understood one. They define accountability 
as the process of holding actors responsible for their actions (Gaventa & McGee, 2010). More 
specifically, they define it as the process that targets public, private and civil society 
organizations to be held responsible for executing their powers according to a defined standard 
(Gaventa & McGee, 2010).  
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There are different ways to achieve different types of accountability. Gaventa and McGee (2010) 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability refers to forms 
of accountability that are between citizens and the state and are enforced through electoral 
participation. On the other hand, horizontal accountability refers to internal checks and balances 
between various organs of the state that also includes the oversight of state agencies by 
independent public bodies to be held responsible for executing their powers according to a 
defined standard (Gaventa & McGee, 2010).  
Goetz and Jenkins (2001) further distinguish between de jure accountability and de facto 
accountability. The latter refers to accountability that occurs in practice and not as required by 
law or intent. The distinction is important to describe the reality of a particular context as 
opposed to the formal rules that describe what ought to be.  
Kosack and Fung (2014) also distinguish between a long and short route to accountability. In the 
short route to accountability citizens engage directly with service providers. In the long route, 
citizens use elections and advocacy to pressurize and influence policy makers and politicians to 
improve service delivery. A combination of both is also possible.  
There are also many scholars who attempt to explain how transparency leads to accountability. 
Lindtedt and Nauren (2010) argue that accountability is different from transparency and publicity. 
In addition, that accountability requires more than exposure. Lindtedt and Nauren (2010) further 
argue that accountability implies that where there is misconduct a sanction must be imposed on 
the act. Similarly, Fox (2010) distinguishes between two faces of accountability, answerability 
and answerability that is accompanied by sanctions, noting that these two have different impacts 
on the achievement of accountability.  
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Lindtedt and Nauren (2010) contend that the most important sanctioning mechanism available 
for citizens is through elections. This type of accountability is referred to as political 
accountability and is usually accompanied by legal accountability through a functioning 
judiciary. It is distinguishable from administrative and constitutional accountability (Goetz & 
Jenkins, 2001). Furthermore, Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) argue that democracy and the rule of 
law are crucial for achieving political accountability. Moreover, that transparency will be less 
effective in combating corruption if it is not accompanied by institutional and other 
circumstances that are favourable to achieving accountability such as democracy.  
In addition, Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) also distinguish between agent controlled transparency 
and non-agent controlled transparency to determine which type of transparency is more 
important to achieve accountability. Agent controlled transparency refers to self-imposed or 
externally imposed requirements to release key information to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the 
principal. On the other hand, non-agent controlled relies more on mediators such as investigative 
journalists. They conclude that agent controlled information is less effective in achieving 
accountability and to limit corruption compared to a free press (Lindstedt and Nauren, 2010).  
Furthermore, Lindstedt and Nauren (2010) argue that these findings have an implication on the 
type of reforms that are important for the reduction of corruption. They argue that in contexts 
where there is low levels of education and press freedom and in semi-democratic political 
systems, transparency reforms must be accompanied by reforms to strengthen the capacity of 
people to access and process information. Moreover, they argue that imposing sanctions are also 
important reforms to reduce corruption (Lindstedt & Nauren, 2010). This means that on its own, 
transparency is not enough.  
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Similarly, Bellver and Kaufmann’s (2005) contend that the role of information disclosure should 
not replace the provision of voice and participation mechanisms that aim to empower 
communities to hold officials accountable. They also recommend that top-down oversight 
strategies should also be accompanied by bottom-up ones to improve corruption and achieve 
accountability.  
Gaventa and McGee (2010) argue that there is a growing need to recognize and institutionalize a 
form of accountability that goes beyond elections. These are citizen-led forms of accountability 
with an end goal of enabling citizens to exercise their voice through other means. Goetz and 
Jenkins (2001) refer to this as hybrid or diagonal forms of accountability.  
According to Fox (2015) diagonal accountability refers to hybrid combinations of both vertical 
and horizontal oversight agencies. It involves the direct participation in or management of 
official oversight bodies in the form of state-society power sharing bodies that are created in a 
top-down manner as in the case of “invited spaces” or power sharing institutions (Fox, 2015). 
Goetz and Jenkins (2001) contend that public sector institutions which are responsible for 
monitoring government through horizontal accountability are sometimes under capacitated and 
not open to citizen participation. They further argue that if hybrid forms of engagement that 
include citizens are to be established they have to be given legal standing within institutions of 
public sector oversight (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001).  
Gaventa and McGee (2010) argue that diagonal accountability is important and able to improve 
demand side and bottom-up accountability. Simply put, citizen engagement in oversight roles is 
important because as stated by the WB (1999: 3 in Goetz & Jenkins, 2001:365), “If . . . 
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horizontal institutions are the nerves and muscles of corruption control, why would politicians let 
them function effectively”.  
In addition, diagonal accountability creates a blur between horizontal and vertical accountability 
and allows power dynamics to change away from political elites to amplify the voice of 
vulnerable groups. This is especially necessary because elections are periodic and are not 
sufficient as a form of accountability (Ackerman, 2004). They also represent the long route 
towards accountability and are therefore not as efficient. Additionally, free and fair elections are 
subject to structural and context specific difficulties. This calls for more depoliticized forms of 
accountability and the legal institutionalization of participative mechanisms because this will 
create a more active enforcement of accountability (Ackerman, 2004).  
Ackerman (2004) builds on the concept of diagonal accountability and suggests that “co-
governance” is important to ensure that social actors are invited to participate in the core 
activities of the state. Ackerman (2004) further contends that social protest and consultation are 
insufficient forms of accountability. Moreover, Ackerman (2004) argues that the exclusion of 
citizens in key decision making and oversight bodies is usually in the interest of marketization 
strategies and this hinders active participation of citizens in the form of “exit”. One can conclude 
that there is a need to move beyond exclusive elite domains by the executive of acquiring 
accountability towards citizen-led accountability that prioritizes the voice of excluded 
individuals due to skewed power imbalances in come contexts. Transparency initiatives that are 
mainly found in construction, environmental and extractive sectors attempt to bridge this gap and 
this paper will show how.  
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Critique of Transparency: 
Heald (2012) argues that there’s a narrative that transparency is a cure to all governance 
problems. This gives transparency the appearance of a panacea and this is problematic. 
Furthermore, Heald (2012) also warns against over exposure and argues that too much 
transparency can also be problematic because it has the potential to expose sensitive information 
that can increase rather than curb corruption. 
Moreover, Etzioni (2010) criticizes transparency for being overvalued and without a solid 
ideological basis because it cannot fulfill the functions it is said to achieve. In addition,  that this 
is especially in light of the fact that there is a dearth of studies about transparency and its impacts 
with little empirical studies as well.  
Scholars such as Gillies (2010) also agree with this assertion by questioning why the concept has 
gained so much support and popularity despite a lack of empirical studies. Etzioni (2010) also 
argues that most available findings about transparency are based on voluntary transparency 
mechanisms at the community level that are not government imposed and none of these studies 
indicate that transparency should replace regulation. Therefore, Etzioni (2010) suggests that for 
transparency to have more impact, more government enforced regulation is necessary.  
This argument raises questions about the possible veracity that voluntary transparency initiatives 
have. Etzioni (2010) argues that transparency is a regulation itself but perhaps too light and 
hence limited in its reach as a form of regulation. Kolstad and Søreide (2009) agree that 
voluntary initiatives are not enough to effect accountability because too much onus is given to 
the government to choose whether or not it should be accountable and this does not change its 
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incentives in any meaningful way. It thus important to unpack how transparency became a 
globalized norm despite its weaknesses.  
6.7.The Rise of Transparency as a Global Norm?  
The call for transparency originated from the anti-corruption campaign pushed by the WB and 
UN Global Compact and the business and conflict agenda in Africa (Haufler, 2010). However, 
the agenda did not have a “business and human rights agenda” which is problematic especially 
for the recognition of community rights and their interaction with government and corporations. 
Other organizations that formed part of this agenda included Global Witness, Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and the Fund for Peace and launched campaigns about the 
role of business in conflict affected countries (Haufler, 2010). As the call for transparency 
intensified, the confidentiality clause, which had become a standard practice in the extractive 
industry became increasingly problematic. Transparency International led the anti-corruption 
campaign and Global Witness directed more focus on the extractive industry with its report on 
the Angolan Oil industry (Haufler, 2010).  
Transparency has emerged as a highly recommended policy response to address poor governance 
and the “resource curse” (Gillies & Heuty, 2011). Many international actors and “investors” have 
rallied behind the making of transparency as a global norm despite its limitations especially in 
predatory states that have high corruption and authoritarian rule (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005). 
Haufler (2010:56) argues that the idea of transparency as a global norm can be understood as a 
product, “of its complementarities with broader global norms that characterize the contemporary 
normative environment, the entrepreneurship of particular actors, and the intersection of different 
agendas and transnational networks”. This argument emphasizes the centrality of actors that are 
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behind the promotion of transparency. Furthermore, Haufler (2010) contends that transparency 
underscores market efficiency and bureaucratic rationality at the expense of government 
expansion because it relies on liberalism which confers more legitimacy to the private sector. 
Hence, transparency is viewed as the less costly way to regulate the private sector. 
In addition, Haufler (2010) compares the global normativity given to transparency with corporate 
social responsibility because it is seen to be the better fit for the prevailing system. The system is 
basically mostly characterized by the privileging of market-based solutions to social and 
environmental problems (Gupta, 2010). These market-based solutions can be seen as substitutes 
for more threatening authoritative sanctions (Fox, 2010).  
Moreover, Haufler (2010) argues that these ideas are spread through a process in which 
particular NGOs set an international agenda and then further develop coalitions with states and 
international organizations. Haufler (2010) contends that activists in the global North 
strategically deploy ideas and are able to promote new norms to manipulate the international 
agenda in favour of an audience that primarily belongs to the North. It is this audience in the 
form of “investors” and consumers who have the influence to make sizeable shifts in the market 
(Haufler, 2010). It follows then that the legitimacy of policies like transparency become 
legitimized in the North and are transported to host governments in the developing world. This 
underscores the reality of power relationships that are present internationally.  
Transparency can also be as seen as part of the “procedural” trend in global political affairs 
which makes political issues about technicalities (Gupta, 2008). However as Kolstad and Wiig 
(2009a) argue, the approach taken by international institutions to export technical reforms to 
developing countries denies the importance of institutional context.   
Why is Transparency Not Enough to Address the Institutions Curse? 
A Case Study of Nigeria’s Implementation of the EITI. 
Page | 52 
 
In agreement with other scholars, Gillies (2010) contends that the ascendance of oil sector 
transparency served the reputational agendas of powerful actors such as international oil 
companies (IOCs) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the North. The oil industry in 
developing countries has always been attractive for profit making and investment. However, they 
argue that IFIs have recently been subjected to increased scrutiny by civil society and this began 
to pose significant challenges for reputational risk. In this context, the support behind oil sector 
transparency was seen as a useful, low cost tool for their public image. The EITI was thus 
created in the context described above.  
7. Chapter 3: Evaluating the EITI 
7.1.The History of the EITI: 
The EITI has its origins in the UK when it started out as a foreign policy proposal by Tony Blair 
at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (Haufler, 2010). It is part of global 
trend of “governance by disclosure” (Sovacool, et al., 2016). It was created following the 
conclusion of the Publish What You Pay Campaign (PWYP).  
PWYP is a coalition that consists of 800 NGOs which helped establish the EITI. PWYP was 
established after the Global Witness report of 1999, A Crude Awakening (Wilson & van Alstine, 
2014). This report exposed the role of oil and banking industries and their complicity in looting 
state assets during Angola’s forty-year war (Alstine, 2014). Today, the PWYP plays a watchdog 
role of the EITI to mobilize civil society to make demands about its processes (Alstine, 2014).  
The EITI secretariat is based in Oslo in Norway and is funded by supporting governments and 
companies. It has a board consisting of 20 members which provides oversight to participating 
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countries. There is a global EITI conference that takes place every two years with representatives 
from all participating countries. This is also where the EITI board is also elected (EITI, 2015). 
The EITI is among many other transparency and resource governance initiatives such as the 
PWYP campaign, Revenue Watch Institute, Natural Resource Charter, Resource Governance 
Index, Africa Mining Vision and Africa Progress Panel (Wilson & van Alstine, 2014).  
7.2.How Does the EITI Work?  
The EITI is a voluntary global standard that aims to ensure that companies disclose payments to 
governments. It is distinguishable from the PWYP that advocates for the mandatory disclosure of 
revenues (Alstine, 2014). Furthermore, the EITI is a government driven process that requires 
governments to apply to join on a voluntary basis (Wilson & van Alstine, 2014). Overtime, it 
also mandates the disclosure of other payments including in-country financial payments. 
Moreover, the EITI also supports training and capacity building dialogue at the national and 
regional levels. The entire process is overseen by a MSI which makes decisions about the daily 
operation of the EITI process (Wilson & van Alstine, 2014). 
The EITI has “principles” which were agreed upon by various stakeholders in 2003 at the 
Lancaster Conference in the United kingdom. These principles are the cornerstone of the EITI 
and highlight the importance of resource wealth to sustainable development, economic growth 
and the reduction of poverty (EITI, 2016). These principles regard transparency in extractive 
government revenues and expenditure as a way to initiate public debate to improve public 
financial public management and accountability. In addition, that the achievement of 
transparency must be set in a context that respects contracts and laws of a particular context 
(EITI, 2016).  
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The EITI also has a set of “requirements” which were first known as the “rules” in 2009. These 
were revised in 2011 to be known as the EITI “standard” (Alstine, 2017). The rules of the EITI 
basically describe how the EITI works as illustrated in Figure 1. and implementing countries 
have to meet these minimum requirements for compliance (Ölcer, 2009). Validation occurs after 
two years and in four phases: signing up, preparation, disclosure and dissemination.  
The rules evolved over time to include first, the need for oversight by a MSG involving 
government, companies and full, independent, active and effective civil society participation 
(EITI, 2015). Second, the disclosure of the legal and institutional framework including the 
allocation of contracts and licenses to understand how the fiscal regime is structured. In 2017, 
the requirement for the disclosure of beneficial ownership was also included. Third, the 
disclosure of all exploration and production to enable stakeholders to be knowledgeable about 
the potential of the sector. Fourth, the comprehensive disclosure of revenue paid by companies 
and received by governments including taxes and royalties at the subnational level. Additionally, 
the disclosure of all payments must be disaggregated (EITI, 2015). Fifth, the EITI requires 
transparency in revenue allocations to enable stakeholders to understand how revenues are 
recorded in national and subnational levels. Sixth, it requires the disclosure of social and 
economic expenditure at the national and subnational to determine the impacts of the extractive 
industry. Seventh, it requires that information be disseminated widely enough to raise public 
awareness and debate. Finally, the standard also outlines deadlines for the publication of EITI 
reports for compliance and explains the steps for countries that wish to apply in future (EITI, 
2015).  
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Figure 1. How the EITI works (Ölcer, 2009:14).  
 
As of 2018, the EITI is being implemented by 51 countries (EITI, 2018). It currently has 24 
member states in Africa which represent almost half of the global total. The number of countries 
that are implementing the EITI continue to increase yearly. In addition, the investment directed 
to EITI implementation has rapidly increased. It currently stands at $2.4 trillion up from $1.67 
trillion in 2016 (Sovacool et al., 2016; EITI, 2018). The increasing amount of investment and 
implementing countries is evidence that transparency has indeed become a global norm and more 
so in the developing world. The EITI is also supported by Extractive Companies, OECD 
countries and several International Organizations and Financial Institutions (Ölcer, 2009). 
Support for the EITI is done bilaterally or through the EITI multi-donor trust fund which is 
managed by the WB (Wilson & van Alstine, 2014).  
The EITI countries are divided into candidate and complaint countries. If a country meets these 
requirements within two years, it will become compliant and if not it will be suspended 
(Aaronson, 2011).  
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7.3.Transparency and the EITI:  
Several scholars cite different reasons for the creation of the EITI thus making it difficult to 
theoretically link it to the “natural resource curse” directly. However, there are also several 
studies in the literature that indicate that poor economic growth is a consequence of a lack of 
transparency (Sovacool, Walter & van de Graaf, 2016). The EITI is thus primarily seen as a tool 
to promote global transparency for the oil, gas and mining sectors.  
Sovacool et al. (2016) describe the EITI as tool that was developed to improve domestic 
governance in resource-rich countries to improve transparency and achieve accountability to the 
collection of revenues. Some proponents argue that accountability can simply be achieved if 
extractive companies publicly disclose their payments to governments (Haufler, 2010; Wilson & 
van Alstine, 2014). Furthermore, that the EITI through its transparency requirements, will 
improve the management of natural resources, reduce corruption and mitigate conflict. These 
benefits will extend beyond the extractive industry and penetrate a country’s institutions for the 
better. As a consequence, citizens will be empowered to demand a more equitable and 
sustainable development (Haufler, 2010).  
A survey of the literature shows that the fundamental assumption behind the EITI is that 
transparency and accountability can improve institutions and mitigate negative impacts from 
resource wealth (Corrigan, 2014). It is thus reasonable to conclude that a major theoretical goal 
of the EITI is to mitigate the institutions curse. The EITI is therefore a good example of an 
international initiative that aims to combat the institutions curse and hence the subject of analysis 
of this paper.  
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Moreover, in the literature, the EITI is described as a public-private partnership/multi-sectoral 
institutional arrangement that brings together resource-rich countries, TNOCs and civil society 
(Sovacool et al., 2016). The goal is to establish partnerships to manage conflict (Aaronson, 2011). 
Additionally, the EITI is supposed to provide a platform where accountability and coordination 
are horizontally organized and are not dictated by power dynamics in decision making especially 
seeing that power dynamics are an important element of the institutions curse (Aaronson, 2011) 
There is also  consensus amongst scholars that the key to the EITI is its MSI/MSG (Mainhardt-
Gibbs, 2010; Sovacool et al., 2016). The EITI requires multi-stakeholder oversight that involves 
the government, extractive companies and a full, independent, active and effective participation 
of civil society (EITI, 2015). The MSG is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 
EITI. The government must ensure that the invitation to participate in the group is open and 
transparent, that all stakeholders are adequately represented although it is not required that they 
be equally represented (EITI, 2015).  
The MSG may include representatives from trade unions, parliamentarians, relevant government 
agencies, civil society, private sector or the media. Each stakeholder has the right to appoint its 
own representative. The EITI recommends that a consideration by government should also be 
made to establish the MSG’s legal basis (EITI, 2015). 
To successfully fulfill its mandate the MSI must be effective, legitimate and be able to provide 
accountability (Magnoa & Gatmaytan, 2017). Furthermore, the MSG must also have the capacity 
to implement its duties which involve the undertaking of outreach activities with civil society 
and companies in the form of communication about EITI information to the broader public and 
their constituencies. Furthermore, duties of the MSG also include the approval of work plans, 
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EITI Reports and annual progress reports (EITI, 2015). However, whilst MSGs are tasked with 
the role of policy oversight and implementation and not policy bargaining or making. They are 
not meant to replace existing government institutions (Truex & Søreide, 2010). 
Studies on the MSI show that a strong civic space, political will and the participation of the 
private sector are significant for its successful implementation (Magnoa & Gatmaytan, 2017). 
The local country context may also hinder or facilitate implementation (Truex & Søreide, 2010). 
In addition, Truex and Søreide (2010) argue that since initiatives like the EITI are foreign 
constructs, it is important for MSGs to obtain local legitimacy to avoid becoming redundant. It is 
therefore important to ensure that there is always a balance between international pressure and 
local ownership. 
One can conclude that the EITI has the potential to become an arena that can achieve hybrid 
accountability because it is a power sharing institutional arrangement. This is done through the 
MSI where government can invite civil society and TNOCs in an attempt to achieve 
accountability (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001). The MSI thus attempts to collapse the distance between 
the short and long route to accountability (Kosack and Fung, 2014). In doing so, the MSI has the 
potential to compensate for weak horizontal and vertical accountability by offering a platform in 
which citizens, through CSOs, can directly engage with government and companies to obtain 
accountability in the extractive sector (Gaventa and McGee, 2010).  
7.4.The Impact of EITI in Implementing Countries: 
The EITI is reported to have inter alia strengthened governance systems, guided policy reports, 
identified beneficial ownership of extractive revenues to assist with Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs), 
transparency in commodity trading and improved access to data (Magnoa & Gatmaytan, 2017). 
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Some studies have validated these claims. However, some studies refute the claims that the EITI 
has made any significant difference in resource governance.  
One the most cited benefits of the EITI is its impact on the mineral investment climate of a 
compliant country (Malden, 2017). This also partly explains why some countries have 
voluntarily joined the EITI. Countries have a strong incentive to join the EITI to improve their 
reputation and reduce the perceived risk of investing in their mineral sector (Sovacool et al, 2016; 
Malden, 2017). Hence, the EITI is no longer regarded as a threat to competitive advantage even 
by companies. Instead it is now seen as important for their corporate reputation (Sovacool et al., 
2016). Another benefit of the EITI also includes increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
(Sovacool et al., 2016). Adherence to the EITI is mostly seen by international actors and 
investors as signaling the intention to improve the business climate (Aaronson, 2011).  
Furthermore, there is also some evidence that there is some improvement in civil society 
participation in EITI implementing countries through the MSG (Mainhardt-Gibbs, 2010; Wilson 
& van Alstine, 2014). For example, the Liberian government uses the EITI reports as a basis for 
discussion with citizens about corruption, distribution of revenues and accountability. In addition, 
the Mongolian government uses the EITI as a platform to discuss governance related matters 
such as whether the government should obtain a stake in mining or tax it (Aaronson, 2011). 
There is hope that the over time, the governance skills learnt from participating in the EITI will 
spill over into other sectors of the economy and institutions. 
7.5.The Critique of the EITI: 
The EITI is often critiqued for not clearly outlining how transparency leads to accountability 
(Wilson & van Alstine, 2014). Many scholars criticize it for its lack of a robust theory of change 
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that can explain how it will contribute to societal change. EITI compliant countries also do not 
outperform other non-compliant countries on resource governance (Sovacool et al., 2016). In 
addition, the EITI is also critiqued for its focus on the extractive industries only and this is seen 
by Sovacool et al. (2016) as a narrow view of transparency. It excludes other aspects of the oil, 
gas and mining value chain such as environmental impact assessments, project siting and the 
displacement of communities.  
The voluntary nature of the EITI has also been critiqued by many scholars. Governments are 
encouraged but not obliged to adhere to the principles of transparency. There are no available 
sanctions for countries that do not comply with the EITI requirements except for suspension. 
According to Sovacool et al. (2016) countries have an incentive to join and gain increased 
prestige at a low cost because in the worst case scenario they have nothing to lose. Hence, 
Wilson & van Alstine (2014) call for a mandatory transparency standard. The soft law nature of 
the EITI can prevent positive spillovers into national and international hard law to bring about 
substantive change in policy and regulation (Alstine, 2014).  
The EITI has also been critiqued for its lack of subnational implementation especially at the local 
level and directly to mining affected communities where it is most relevant (Mainhardt-Gibbs, 
2010; Wilson & van Alstine, 2014). Subnational reporting is important to disclose information 
about project level data, social expenditures and contracts (Wilson & van Alstine, 2014). 
Although the EITI currently includes this requirement, its current framework for subnational 
reporting does not penetrate enough to the local level.  
In an African context where some traditional leaders resist the right for communities to exercise 
their voice and achieve political accountability, subnational reporting can stimulate debate and 
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create a demand for communities to hold government and MNCs accountable (Wilson & van 
Alstine, 2014). In addition, subnational reporting is also important in contexts where there is 
unequal spatial distribution of resources and unclear distribution of rents (Caspary, 2012). 
Furthermore, the EITI is critiqued for being unable to make transparency work for sustainable 
development especially at the local level where communities are mostly exposed to the 
extraction projects taking place on their land (Wilson & van Alstine, 2014).  
Another common critique of the EITI is its inability to deter corruption (Corrigan, 2014). 
Corrigan (2014) contends that this is where the distinction between transparency and 
accountability is important because while the EITI has increased transparency, improvements in 
accountability are not easy to achieve. As Kasekende, Abuka and Sarr (n.d.) contend, that 
without proper accountability mechanisms, there will be no consequences for corruption and that 
this may hinder the EITI’s goal. Beyond corruption, the EITI has also been unable to reduce 
violence and maintain political stability (Corrigan, 2014).  
Moreover, Sovacool et al. (2008) criticize the timing of EITI transparency requirements. They 
argue that corruption begins at the early stages of the extractive value chain as opportunities for 
corruption can arise during the exploration, development, construction, operation and exporting 
stages and that the EITI neglects transparency in areas where corruption is most rife. On the 
other hand, Bracking (2009) argues that the lack of transparency at the end of the supply chain in 
the home countries of MNCs and TNCs is another weakness of the EITI that symbolizes the 
hypocrisy of Northern governments.   
Whilst the extractive sector is identified as a key sector that is targeted by IFFs, the EITI is 
critiqued because it is unable to monitor the flow of IFFs and thus unable to identify revenues 
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that are illegally or illegitimately transferred for private gain. Therefore, Sovacool et al. (2016) 
contend that elements of tax justice should be incorporated into the EITI. Similarly, Wilson and 
van Alstine (2014) also support this assertion and contend that the EITI must go beyond revenue 
transparency to include elements of contract transparency and fair taxation. Bracking (2009) 
contends that Africa’s poor economic performance is not only attributable to corruption, it is also 
a result of inequitable mining codes and is less about poor governance suggesting that the EITI 
might be prioritizing the wrong issues.  
There are also significant oil producing countries which have not yet joined the Country 
including Angola, which inspired Global Witness’ call for the establishment of the EITI. For 
example, the United States has been an EITI candidate since 2014 and China has also refrained 
from partaking. Sovacool et al. (2016) argue that this is a double standard on the part of the 
Global North since they are also not without transparency concerns. For example, to improve 
transparency, the U.S. has instead opted to establish the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and the European Union adopted the Accounting Directive of 
2013 which are mandatory rules for their extractive sectors. Sovacool et al. (2016) therefore 
questions the effectiveness of the EITI in the absence of global pacesetters.  
Furthermore, scholars agree that one of the most controversial aspects of the EITI is the role of 
civil society in oversight, monitoring and its participation in the MSG (Alstine, 2017). The 
success of the EITI’s MSG is contingent on the effectiveness of civil society. However, it has 
been reported in several countries that civil society’s role is sometimes hindered by intimidation. 
For example, civil society member sometimes have their travel permits denied and some have 
also been harassed and imprisoned (Sovacool et al., 2016). In 2014, the President of Azerbaijan,  
Ilham Aliyev, enacted a series of constitutional amendments that constrained the operation of 
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civil society organizations and increased their risk of being shut down. Subsequently, Azerbaijan 
was suspended from the EITI due to a lack of satisfactory civil society engagement in the process 
(EITI, 2017).  
There is evidence that although civil society is an important stakeholder in the EITI process, it 
tends to become a silent partner and therefore limits the ability of the EITI to become a 
formidable tool against corruption (Sovacool et al., 2016). Civil society is not treated as an equal 
partner in the EITI and this is problematic (Öge, 2016). Public scrutiny is the most compelling 
component of the EITI (Corrigan, 2014). However, civil society needs to be given a greater role 
through the provision of more information and participation. Furthermore, the public and 
legislators must be made more knowledgeable about the EITI (Corrigan, 2014).  
For example, an EITI evaluation in Madagascar found that the lack of civil society participation 
allows mining companies to override efforts of good governance, transparency and engagement 
with communities (Sovacool, et al., 2016). The lack of civil society participation is deemed to be 
one of the major setbacks of the EITI. This is because the EITI does not obligate the 
implementing country to engage with its citizenry on extractive revenues and this is more 
apparent in governments that resist democratic practices. Sovacool et al. (2016) conclude that 
this is why it is important to not overestimate the utility of multi-sectoral institutional 
arrangements to achieve accountability.  
Caspary (2012) argues that achieving accountability will be difficult in contexts where the 
necessary political, legal and institutional improvements have not taken place (Caspary, 2012). 
The EITI and its focus on transparency is likely not able to address the political and economic 
structural constraints such as a free media and civil society (van Alstine, 2014). Wilson and van 
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Alstine (2014) provide further explanation for why context matters to make the EITI more 
impactful.  
Firstly, political will and the way in which it is gained and maintained in a given context will 
determine the impact of the EITI. Government ownership of the EITI is also important for its 
success (Alstine, 2017; Magnoa & Gatmaytan, 2017). This is because the drivers that led to the 
decision to join the EITI may change and it may become more difficult to maintain the 
momentum for deeper and meaningful implementation through reforms.  
Secondly, the institutionalization of the EITI is important. Therefore, it may be necessary to have  
reforms and institutions in government that will enable effective EITI implementation at the 
national and local level (Alstine, 2017). Thirdly, the EITI reports matter. They must be timely, 
accessible, understandable and easily disseminated. Additionally the public and legislators must 
be aware of the EITI reports in all regions. Finally, a strong private sector support is also needed 
to implement the EITI successfully. 
Bracking (2009) agrees that a stakeholder analysis of the various interests in the EITI is 
imbalanced and that the underlying reliance on the liberal consensus theory which suggests that 
everyone can be winners is problematic. Furthermore, Bracking (2009) argues that the 
development of the extractive industry is located within the Bretton Woods Institutions that 
strategically benefits MNCs at the expense of the broader public and labour requirements.  
In this context, Bracking (2009) contends that the EITI elevates the position of elites and is 
unable to tackle corruption. Therefore, the EITI’s ability to create impartiality enhancing 
institutions is questionable (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a). Instead, Bracking (2009) argues that the 
EITI drives stereotypes about the governance of the Global South whilst concealing the 
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exploitative nature of the Global North’s extractive companies (Bracking, 2009). Consequently, 
corruption is made to be seen as a public sector problem only and leaves the private sector  to get 
off scot-free. This denies the fact corruption can also originate from within the global 
relationship.  
Bracking (2009) therefore warns that tools such as the EITI can delegitimize the Global South 
and their politics. In the pursuit of decolonization and redistribution of wealth, the conversation 
can degenerate in substance and become mostly about corruption. The EITI can thus be seen as a 
tool that places companies and governments in powerful positions to not invest in expensive 
public participation processes (Smith, Shepherd & Dorward, 2012). 
In light of this argument, the EITI is rather a small commitment when compared to the benefits 
of the neo-liberal regulatory regime in Africa. By placing the establishment of the EITI in the 
Bretton Woods Institutions context, a key policy of Capitalism, Bracking (2009) supports the 
assertion that the EITI is a low cost solution for the system’s failures. Furthermore, Bracking 
(2014) contends that the construction of neo-liberal forms of good governance alongside a 
Capitalist system will continue to breed corruption. The EITI can therefore also be seen as a 
reformist initiative that seeks change incrementally (van Alstine, 2014). However, van Alstine 
(2014) argues that it may be an important step in the resource governance agenda and that it is 
important to acknowledge that institutional reforms may take prolonged periods of adjustment 
and the outcomes of the EITI may only be reaped in decades to come (Öge, 2016).  
Bracking (2009) also criticizes the EITI for using an imagined community in the form of civil 
society to fulfill its oversight role in the MSG. The MSG relies on national NGOs to represent 
local communities. The EITI has therefore been criticized for high centralization which limits 
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participation from local communities making it elitist (Alstine, 2017). This is problematic 
because the role of local communities is important to address the institutions curse and excluding 
them can have detrimental consequences (Lawera, Lukas & Jørgensen, 2017).  
At the local level, institutions, power dynamics and politics are characterized by culturally rooted 
chieftaincy, conflicts, self-interest and unaccountable local institutions that impedes people’s 
access to mining benefits that should reduce poverty and lead to socio-economic development 
(Lawera et al., 2017). In a context of decentralized despotism in which communities have proven 
that their voice can make a significant change, the role of local institutions is an understudied 
subject in the institutions curse (Luthango, 2018). The consequence is that national policies 
become out of touch with the realities on community level. For example, in advocating for the 
right to consent, the Xolobeni community in South Africa, has shown that mining affected 
communities should be equal stakeholders in resource governance (Luthango, 2018). 
Decentralization creates new arenas of rent-seeking at local and national levels which will need 
local communities to be empowered to achieve accountability (Lawera, et al., 2017).  
Successful implementation of the EITI is also more difficult in authoritarian or transitional 
countries where civil society is restricted by financial, technical and bureaucratic constraints to 
exercise their whistleblowing and monitoring capacities (Öge, 2016b; Alstine, 2017). Öge 
(2016b) argues that democracies have better tools to address the challenges of resource 
governance.  
In addition, Öge (2016) argues that the EITI can be used to achieve “mock compliance”, a 
rational process which attempts to appease an external audience by mimicking compliance to 
global norms whilst having hidden behavioural divergence. In the case of the EITI, government 
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leaders are open to join it because the benefits of compliance may outweigh the costs (Öge, 2016; 
Magnoa & Gatmaytan, 2017). Mock compliance is problematic because the benefits are only 
reserved for governments at the expense of genuine efforts that can benefit citizens.  
However, Truex and Søreide, (2010) contend that although the challenges of the MSG are 
common across all contexts, each MSG should be analyzed individually with its particular 
barriers understood, treated and addressed accordingly. Hence the paper’s focus on Nigeria.  
7.6. Methodology: 
The paper mostly surveyed secondary data in the form of books, journals, online sources, online 
newspapers and EITI publications to make its conclusions . It adopts the term, “institutions curse” 
from Menaldo (2016) instead of the, “natural resource curse” as coined by Auty (1994) to shift 
the focus away from natural resources per se towards a focus on the management of natural 
resources and its effects on development. This is done to underscore the shift in the literature 
away from a simplistic view about the impacts of natural resource abundance towards a more 
nuanced view that identifies a country’s institutional context as a relevant factor that will affect 
development. In addition, this paper argues that the institutions curse is mostly caused by 
resource rents, the revenue that is derived from oil, and how it is managed and not merely by 
resource abundance or resource dependence (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2007). Although, 
countries with weak institutions are likely to be dependent on natural resources and hence do not 
diversify. The paper’s reference to development is not limited to economic growth. It includes 
social and political development indicators such as education, health and environmental well-
being. 
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The institutions curse denotes an intermediate causal link between natural resources and 
institutions. In this case, oil and minerals exert a negative impact on development via the 
deleterious impact on institutional quality ( Sala-i- Martin & Subramanian, 2003). The paper 
argues that natural resources test the quality of institutions and if they are weak, it leads to 
underdevelopment. There is consensus in the literature that good enough institutions will 
eliminate the institutions curse (Haufler, 2010). One of the most recommended policy 
prescriptions for ameliorating the institutions curse is a need for transparency and accountability 
(William, 2011). However, this paper refutes this claim and argues that transparency is not 
enough.  
This paper relies on the argument provided by Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) who argue that political 
economy models which focus on how certain resource rents lead to dysfunctional patronage or 
rent-seeking behavior are central to understanding the causes of the resource curse. Using their 
“impartiality enhancing institutions” theory, the paper argues that corruption, in the form of rent-
seeking and patronage, can be neutralized but not through transparency alone. Impartiality 
enhancing institutions also describe which institutions are the most important to overcome the 
institutions curse.  
In a context of bad institutional equilibrium where transparency is low and there is a lack of 
accountability, impartiality enhancing institutions are important to strengthen the interest of the 
public as opposed to institutions that increase the power of political elites. Impartiality enhancing 
institution are deemed by Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) as especially important for resource-rich 
countries where laws and policies mostly benefit the elite. They are supposed to encourage 
power and representation to become more equal (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a). In this paper, the elite 
are both government officials and TNOCs. By applying Kolstad and Wiig’s (2009a) theory, the 
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paper therefore understands the institutions curse as a political and social issue and not a purely 
technical one. It does not concentrate on capacity or regulation solutions for the institutions curse.  
The paper uses a single case study research approach to obtain a detailed analysis about 
Nigeria’s implementation of the EITI because it is a flagship country of the EITI and one of the 
first countries to join it (Asgill, 2012). This means that the paper will have enough evidence 
based on Nigeria’s years of EITI implementation to make a fair assessment. Nigeria is also an oil 
producing country, a key sector of the EITI. Furthermore, Nigeria is the largest oil-producing 
country in Africa but also one of the most corrupt in the World. It also has a high poverty rate. 
Corruption, in the form of rent-seeking and patronage dominate Nigeria’s political economy. 
Hence, Nigeria is a good case study to illustrate the institutions curse.  
The single case study approach is better suited to test whether the generalizations made by the 
EITI in its objectives about the achievement of transparency and accountability apply in every 
context (Punch, 2005). Furthermore, a single case study approach will illuminate how the EITI 
interacts in a context where an institutions curse exists. Generalizations can be made from this 
case study because EITI country members are mostly characterized by high corruption rates and 
low income. The findings obtained from Nigeria can be used in other similar contexts as well 
about the possible potential impediments for implementing the EITI.  
When applying the broad definition of transparency, most scholars see transparency as having 
the potential to ameliorate the institutions curse that is mostly caused by a lack of accountability 
institutions (Gaventa and McGee, 2010). This definition of transparency goes beyond the simple 
definitions of transparency that focus on issues of access, timeliness, understandability and 
publicity. It also goes beyond economic transparency but understands that economic 
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transparency can lead to political transparency and is also part of it. Furthermore, a broad 
definition of transparency mandates the achievement of accountability through the release of 
information.  
The paper uses the EITI as an example of a transparency initiative that attempts to achieve 
accountability in the oil sector. The EITI’s main objective is to achieve accountability through 
the release of information. It thus uses a broad definition of transparency and hence the subject 
of this paper. The EITI literature is dominated by multi-case study approaches that aren’t able to 
explain how the EITI interacts with a country’s institutions. It is also for this reason that a single 
case study approach is used.  
The major limitation of the single case study approach is that findings and generalizations cannot 
be easily applied to another context (Punch, 2005). However, a single case-study approach is 
more suited to delineate context specific challenges that may hinder the success of the EITI as a 
global standard. Furthermore, the cause study approach is better suited to determine whether 
there is a need to rethink some of the EITI’s principles to facilitate its implementation and 
increase its success rate in overcoming the institutions curse. Or rather, that an alternative must 
be found.  
8. Chapter 5: EITI Implementation in Nigeria  
8.1.The Institutions Curse: 
As a former British colony that attained independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited a system of 
decentralized despotism characterized by ethnic rule over minorities. After independence, 
Muslim Northerners sustained a weak hegemony over an ethnically polarized federal polity 
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which subsequently, after a succession of military coups, broke into a civil war in 1967 in Biafra 
(Watts, 2004). The political economy of Nigeria is telling that it inherited institutions that are 
bequeathed by four decades of military dictatorships (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003).  
Patronage politics are the order of the day. This is also exacerbated by the fact that the 
government does not tax citizens enough and this makes it difficult to achieve accountability 
(Ross, 2015). Furthermore, there is no strong legal and institutional framework that regulates the 
environment against oil pollution in the form of gas flares and oil spills (Omeje, 2013). 
In the case of Nigeria, the Dutch Disease cannot explain its poor development outcomes (Sala-i-
Martin & Subramanian, 2003). In 1986, the share of agriculture in GDP, which used to be the 
main sector of the economy, declined from 68% to 35% in 1981 (Garuba & Ikubaje, 2010). The 
government divested in the agricultural sector to develop a manufacturing sector. Simultaneously, 
the size of the service sector, especially government services also increased. As explained by 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), the decline in the agricultural sector was not caused by 
the Dutch Disease. Instead, as argued by this paper, it was caused by an institutions curse.  
This is evidenced by the fact the Nigerian agricultural sector experienced a boom in the mid-
1980s while the manufacturing sector has been in decline since the 1980s (Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2003). The Dutch Disease focuses on the reallocation of resources toward the 
natural resource sector at the expense of the manufacturing industry which did not happen in 
Nigeria (Williams, 2011). It happens when a natural resource boom crowds out potential new 
industries. In the case of Nigeria, the agricultural sector was already mature (Kublusek, 2010). 
One can conclude that the Dutch Disease does not apply in Nigeria and that economic 
explanations of its negative development outcomes are not satisfactory.  
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Nigeria can be described as the epitome of the institutions curse because waste and corruption of 
oil rents cause underdevelopment. Resource revenues and how they are managed, as opposed to 
abundance or dependence affected its institutions negatively (Williams, 2011). The negative 
impact caused by resource rents also caused the lack of diversification of its economy (Menon, 
2018). Hence, Nigeria’s oil dependence used to be at about 70-80%, oil revenue accounted for 
about 80% of fiscal revenues, 90-95% of export revenues and 30-35% of GDP (Shaxson, 2009). 
Thus the Nigerian oil sector can be described as enclave with few direct linkages to the rest of 
economy. In addition, whilst Nigeria also has the largest oil reserves in Africa, oil reserves are 
not correlated to negative development outcomes (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2007).  
Nigeria’s development experience is also dismal. It has a high inequality and poverty rate. 
Additionally, it is ranked 157 by the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2018). As of 2018, 
Nigeria has overtaken India as the country with the largest number of people living in extreme 
poverty with an estimated 87 million Nigerians living on less than $1.90 a day (Adebayo, 2018). 
Nigeria continues to struggle to translate its oil wealth into socio-economic growth (Adebayo, 
2018).  
Moreover, Nigeria is ranked 148 out of 180 by the corruption watchdog, Transparency 
International, which indicates that it has a high prevalence of corruption (Transparency 
International, 2017). The politics of Nigeria are shaped by a race to access oil revenues (Sala-i-
Martin & Subramanian, 2003). Ultimately this has led to poor institutional quality which has 
contributed to underdevelopment. 
Oil revenues in Nigeria  are divided between federal, state and local government (Shaxson, 2009). 
The federal level receives about half of the revenues, state governments receive a quarter and 
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local governments about a fifth. The allocation to state and local governments is based on a 13%  
share of derivation from locally produced natural resources which are mostly oil and gas. This 
share is paid into states where resources are produced (Shaxson, 2009). Furthermore, there are 
also funds that are channeled into a special fund account.  
As oil revenues increased, so did fiscal centralism (Watts, 2004). This was also followed by a 
shift away from the derivation principle towards a centrally controlled Federation Account 
(Watts, 2004). State and local government revenues are also heavily dependent on federal 
revenues. These revenues are derived from taxes and royalties from the oil sector (Jaob-Peterside, 
2010). Oil revenues flow into a centralized federal state characterized by weak institutions that 
fuel corruption (Watts, 2004). This is why Nigeria lags behind other oil producing states such as 
Malaysia and Brazil which have developed linkages with other sectors in their respective 
economies (Jaob-Peterside, 2010).  
The Niger Delta, which accounts for about 90% of Nigerian foreign exchange earnings, is at the 
centre of oil politics. Voting fraud was reported in 2003 and violence has since escalated 
between ethnic communities that is led by militant youth movements (Watts, 2004). Citizens 
from the Niger Delta are marginalized and excluded from oil benefits and decision making 
structures. As host communities, they experience the harsh environmental degradation of oil 
production. Land ownership disputes are the order of the day and communities are inadequately 
compensated for it (Müller, 2010). Furthermore, host communities have lost their livelihoods. 
The only recourse currently available to communities is provided by oil companies through 
community development projects and Memoranda of Understanding (Müller, 2010). Niger Delta 
communities do protest, however, the government responds with violence and communities are 
left without an outlet to voice their concerns (Asgill, 2012).  
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One can conclude that political liberties are not respected in Nigeria and there are efforts by the 
government and companies to stifle any form of resistance through the securitization of the Niger 
Delta (Müller, 2010). The Niger Delta situation can thus be described as grievance rebellion, it 
describes a context of patronage and rent-seeking where local communities have no platforms to 
voice their concerns about mining impacts and thus resort to violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). 
This means that the Niger Delta does not have impartiality enhancing institutions that can 
address community grievances in any fair and meaningful way.  
Müller (2010) describes Nigeria as a “war economy” that is characterized by the bunkering of oil 
that benefits militants and the military elite who collaborate with them and undermine 
transparency and accountability. The lack of transparency and accountability are partly 
responsible for the negative consequences of oil extraction in the Niger Delta (Müller, 2010).  
To mitigate the oil effects on war and community grievances, Humphreys (2005) suggests that 
TNOCs must be regulated, governments must be transparent and civil society must oversee to it 
that accountability is achieved. In the Nigerian context, this has proved difficult to do due to the 
dependence of government on TNOCs in the form of an oil complex (Watts, 2004). Watts 
(2003:59) describes the relationship between oil companies and the Nigerian state as a “sick 
alliance”. Kanzleiter and Becker (2018) refer to this alliance as organized capitalism, where the 
state and economy fuse to create state monopoly capitalism characterized by a formation of 
cartels. The major TNOCs operating in Nigeria include Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon-Mobil, 
Chevron-Texaco, Elf and Agip (Omeje, 2013). Although transparency and accountability are 
recognized as able to address the institutions curse, institutions are known to exhibit stubborn 
persistence. This means that whilst Nigeria is a formal democracy, the balance of power between 
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citizens and public officials; the state and local government is still skewed in favour of elites 
(Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003).  
In addition, Nigeria’s institutional framework, which is also inherited from the colonial state is 
characterized by exclusionary and unsustainable mineral resource laws (Joab-Peterside, 2010). 
Local communities are excluded from participating in policy decisions. Access to oil benefits is a 
mirage (Joab-Peterside, 2010). Women are also marginalized in the oil sector. They can neither 
participate due to a lack of finances and have also lost their livelihoods from small scale fishing 
due to the environmental devastation (Garuba & Ikubaje, 2010). Furthermore, checks and 
balances in the form of horizontal accountability are ineffective and the president has wide 
ranging powers (Thurber, Emelife and Heller, 2010). The lack of impartiality enhancing 
institutions as described by Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) is apparent at the local level as 
communities do not have avenues to voice their demands to oil companies or towards the state. 
8.2.Nigeria’s Oil sector: 
Crude oil exploration and production occurs mainly through a joint venture arrangement. The 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has about 57% equity interests in six 
operating oil companies and the production sharing arrangements (Joab-Peterside, 2010). The oil 
sector heavily depends on foreign direct investment as a consequence of liberalization. The 
NNPC is also at the centre of Nigerian oil politics. It is accused of corruption through the bribes 
it receives. There is underpayment of taxes and royalties in the oil sector and the NNPC is 
responsible for reporting inaccurate and misleading figures which have also contributed to poor 
development outcomes (Okeke & Aniche, 2013).  
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Furthermore, the oil production arrangement is characterized by exclusive partnerships that are 
based on confidentiality clauses. The sector is thus enshrouded with secrecy (Okpanachi & 
Andrews, 2012). For example, the MOU’s available to communities are negotiated on their 
behalf by government and company officials. This gives government officials the opportunity to 
negotiate tax amounts on an ad-hoc basis and in a non-transparent manner and this enables the 
receipt of large-scale bribery. An example is the $180 million bribe paid by a consortium of five 
companies including the American firm,  Halliburton to the Nigerian federal government to win 
a $6 billion gas contract (Okpanachi & Andrews, 2012).  
The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is responsible for overseeing and supervising the 
activities of registered oil companies licensed to operate (Okpanachi & Andrews, 2012). The 
DPR has a reputation for being highly corrupt (Omeje, 2013). It also faces regulatory challenges 
because of its confusing status and weak capacity. On paper, the DPR and the NNPC exist as 
separate institutions to be supervised by the Ministry of Petroleum. As the commercial company 
of government, the NNPC is supposed to be regulated by the DPR but in reality, the NNPC also 
performs a regulatory function and monitors its own activities. NNPC is not only corrupt but it 
also has a lack of transparency and is exposed to the discretion of the minister and the president 
and thus vulnerable to political control (Okpanachi & Andrews, 2012). For example, President 
Obosanjo refused to appoint a petroleum Minister and instead performed the role himself. With 
such, discretionary power, transparency is difficult to attain (Okpanachi & Andrews, 2012). In 
addition, as argued by Van der Ploeg (2011), when too much power is conferred to the president 
in a democracy, underdevelopment is more likely to occur. In terms of capacity, the DPR relies 
on private capacity from oil companies to monitor them and struggles to enforce 
regulations(Abutudu & Garuba, 2011).   
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Operations of the oil industry are mostly personalized and defined by a connection to political 
power characterized by a lack of transparency to conceal illegal diversion of rents (Abutudu & 
Garuba, 2011). Thurber et al. (2010) describes Nigerian institutions as having a patronage 
equilibrium. Allocation of oil blocs are based on patronage to politicians, traditional leaders, 
military officials and cronies. The common practice is to resell oil blocs. For example,  Lt-
General T.Y. Danjuma made US$500 million from an oil bloc that he later sold for US$1billion. 
As a consequence, it has become a difficult endeavour to keep track of license ownership and 
thus the need for transparency in the sector is evident (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). One can 
conclude that Nigeria can be described as a rentier economy that is dependent on rents and where 
underdevelopment can only be explained by corruption (Asgill, 2012).  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009a), argue that impartiality enhancing institutions can reduce possibilities 
of favouritism and neutralize the adverse effects of oil rents that characterize the political 
economy of Nigeria by punishing those who benefit from opaque transparency and by 
empowering an independent civil society. This paper will critically analyze the EITI’s ability to 
do so in Nigeria.  
8.3.Why Nigeria Joined the EITI: 
The Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act was established in 2007 and 
Nigeria became the first country to implement and domesticate the EITI by creating and enabling 
a legal framework (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). As recommended by Goetz and Jenkins (2001), 
the NEITI is given a legal standing with prospects of being institutionalized. Furthermore, it was 
one of the first countries to voluntarily accede to the EITI in 2004.  
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The NEITI is anchored on the general principles of the EITI to achieve revenue transparency in 
the oil sector and to achieve accountability (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). Nigeria also established a 
secretariat within the presidency. The NEITI Act of 2007 also established the Multi-stakeholder 
Initiative, National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG) responsible for formulating and 
supervising the EITI process in Nigeria (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). Since the inception of the 
NEITI, Nigeria has been struggling to sustain and maintain the implementation of the NEITI as 
envisioned because, as argued by this paper, there were ulterior motives for joining the EITI 
which did not include a true commitment by local elites to be transparent about oil sector 
revenues to achieve accountability.  
One needs to understand that the NEITI was established in the context of Nigeria’s return to 
democratic rule after 1999 (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). It coincided with President Olusegun 
Obansanjo’s economic and anti-corruption reforms. In the beginning of Obasanjo’s 
administration, crude oil output and sales were very low, there were discrepancies in fund 
inflows and outflows, institutional capacity was low and the ineffective management of 
extractive industry revenues was apparent (Gillies, 2007; Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). 
Acceding to the EITI can be seen as part of Obasanjo’s macro-economic reforms targeted at 
improving budgetary planning and implementation, economic diversification, non-oil growth and 
improved implementation of fiscal and monetary policy (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). These 
reforms also targeted structuring privatization in the civil service, the banking sector and trade 
policy. Moreover, reforms were also directed at improving governance and institutional reforms 
such as the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) of 2002 which was responsible 
for prosecuting corrupt public and private officials (Asgill, 2012). The reforms were driven by 
the need to improve Nigeria’s reputational risk to increase investment, aid and renegotiate debt 
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terms with the Paris Club which include the IMF and WB (Gillies, 2007; Asgill, 2012). For 
example, Nigeria was able to renegotiate a US$ 18 million write off in their external debt in 2005 
(Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). In addition, it was driven by the need for Nigeria to influence 
policy-making in the G-8. (Gillies, 2007).  
Nigeria’s accession to the EITI can therefore be located in a context where improving its mineral 
investment climate was important (Malden, 2017). Furthermore, in an attempt to consolidate its 
new democracy, seeking legitimacy from the international community was an easier endeavour 
as compared to local legitimacy (Gillies, 2007). This was done by implementing the EITI by 
which its focus on revenue transparency matched the norms of the international community 
(Kantz, 2008). As articulated by Asgill (2012:44), “the NEITI suits the political goals of a 
government keen to gain legitimacy with both their people and the international community, 
without significantly impacting the system of political rent-seeking”. 
Nigeria has a history of presidents who attempt to consolidate their power and legitimacy by 
discrediting the previous regime. Whilst many public officials have been prosecuted for 
corruption and sentenced to jail, the zeal to prosecute tends to decline as the succeeding regime 
adopts the same habits as preceding ones (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011; Asgill, 2012). The 
commitment to governance reforms declined after a change in government, following the 
conclusion of the debt relief and the NEITI lost their chair. This decline in commitment shows 
that being signatory to the NEITI was driven by ulterior motives. Furthermore, it supports the 
assertion by Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) that where institutions are predatory and characterized by 
corruption, incremental change to institutions in the form of transparency will easily revert to 
bad equilibrium and this is what happened in Nigeria when president Yar’ Adua replaced 
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Obasanjo. President Yar’Adua was accused for orchestrating the fall of the EFCC chair and 
consequently Nigeria’s commitment to anti-corruption has remained questionable (Gillies, 2009). 
Joining the EITI can also be seen as part of increasing economic transparency and hence Nigeria 
has since experienced difficulties in sustaining anti-corruption reforms (Gillies, 2007). In 
economics, the lack of information is mostly associated with market failures (Bellver & 
Kaufmann, 2005). As explained by Gillies (2007), economic transparency receives priority 
because Western governments and investors tolerate a lack of democratic reform in public 
institutions if African leaders advance economic reform that will benefit them. 
The NEITI can be seen as agent-controlled transparency as described by Lindstedt and Nauren 
(2010) because it is not driven by the principal and in this case, local communities and civil 
society. Agent-controlled transparency is generally less effective in achieving transparency and 
accountability because, as in the case of the NEITI, it is centrally driven. The implementation of 
transparency at the local level is limited except in the Bayelsa State in Nigeria (EITI, 2014; 
Nwapi, 2014). There is thus a need to strengthen the demand-side of transparency. Revenue 
transparency is exclusively reserved for companies and the federal government. This excludes 
host communities who are better equipped to hold companies into account because they 
experience the direct impact of the oil industry (Nwapi, 2014). 
8.4.Illusory Transparency? 
The first NEITI audit covered the years 1999-2004. This was the first comprehensive audit of the 
oil and gas sector in Nigeria (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). Furthermore, the NEITI is not just 
limited to reconciliation of revenues (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The financial audit determines 
who paid the money, how much was paid and to whom. The physical audit maps the amount of 
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oil and gas produced, refined, exported and lost. And,  the process audit examines extractive 
industry processes of licensing and capital expenditure (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). By covering 
these aspects of the value chain, the NEITI went over and above requirements of the EITI and 
was dubbed as the “glorious audit” (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). Furthermore, the first audit 
achieved some success in reducing discrepancies in the payments of royalties, taxes and penalties 
such as gas flares (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011).  
The audits also revealed weaknesses in oil governance. The financial audit revealed that oil 
governance is characterized by weak coordination between government agencies, poor data 
keeping systems resulting in discrepancies between revenue that was paid and received. The 
physical audits revealed that loss of crude oil between wellheads and export terminals, oil theft, 
poor metering systems that affect gross production volumes, the absence of standardized industry 
procedures for royalty calculation and the handling of imports of petroleum products (Abutudu 
& Garuba, 2011). The process audit revealed inter alia the abuse of discretionary ministerial 
powers in allocating blocs and inconsistencies in the awarding of petroleum contracts and 
policies.  
The audits were subsequently used by civil society members such as the Civil Society and 
Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), PWYP Nigeria and the Zero-Corruption Coalition to 
engage with the NEITI secretariat about discrepancies in reported figures. For example, the 2005 
audit revealed that there was a difference of 1.05 million barrels between the physical amount of 
oil production and the financial returns made by the Nigerian oil industry. The EITI exposes 
major revenue discrepancies in Nigeria which has widened the anti-corruption space (Abutudu & 
Garuba, 2011). The audits also contribute in stirring up debate about the oil sector in Nigeria.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
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However, some audits, such as the 2005 audit were out of date by six years. This shows a lack of 
commitment and capacity to be transparent in the sector (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). Although, 
the EITI does allow for a two year time lag in audit reports, this makes reports less effective. The 
audits are also not always understandable. Furthermore, the reports conceal the lack of reliability 
in the systems and structures of the oil sector which are responsible for reporting but are deeply 
embedded in a corrupt system (Ejiogu, Ejiogu & Ambituuni, 2018).  
Ejiogu et al. (2018) contend that due to corruption, the Nigerian reporting systems are most 
likely to be unreliable and this is also demonstrated by the weakness in accounting systems. This 
means that the information disclosed in the NEITI does not meet reliability standards as 
described by Kolstad and Wiig (2009b). It thus only fits a narrow understanding of transparency 
and can be described as nominal transparency, the availability of information that is not useful 
and does not ameliorate information asymmetries (Ofori and Lujala, 2015). The information 
released by NEITI audits can thus be described as illusory transparency.  
8.5.NEITI’s Lack of Enforceability: 
The current practice by companies is to refund or opt for restitution for violations revealed by the 
audit. This has major implications for punishing corruption. The NEITI’s value as an anti-
corruption tool is therefore doubtful because achieving accountability depends on what is done 
with the information available (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a; Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The 
information that is revealed by NEITI cannot be used to institute legal action against government 
officials and companies and this is major weakness of the NEITI (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). As 
argued by Lindtedt and Nauren (2010), accountability requires more than disclosure and 
publicity. Instead, it requires that where there is misconduct, sanctions must be imposed.  
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Section 3 of the NEITI Act 2007 is subject to scholarly scrutiny because it reveals its limitation 
in achieving accountability. Section 3(d) and (e) contain a secrecy clause (Abutudu & Garuba, 
2011). The secrecy clause contained in section 3(d and e) leads oil companies to withhold 
important information that may be used to hold them accountable by civil society and 
communities. Furthermore, this provision causes serious limitations for sanctioning and deterring 
the corrupt behaviour of political elites and companies who benefit from bad equilibrium 
(Abutudu & Garuba, 2011).  
Furthermore, section 16 of the Act excludes criminal liability and jail terms. In addition, there is 
no stipulation for revoking licenses as part of a sanctioning mechanism. The Act also states that, 
“liability cannot be placed on an individual if s/he can show the offence was committed without 
his consent or connivance, or that s/he took all necessary actions to ensure that the crime was not 
committed” (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011:28). This provision prevents the possibility of a 
successful prosecution and in doing so, protects TNOCs and government officials unless the 
government intervenes. 
Without powers to prosecute the NEITI will not be able to achieve its mandate of achieving 
accountability. There is also insufficient linkage of prosecutions from the NEITI to other public 
anti-corruption agencies such as the EFCC (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). This is made apparent by 
the fact no EFCC prosecutions have ever emanated from the NEITI secretariat (Abutudu & 
Garuba, 2011). 
Even though the NEITI legally mandates companies and government to oblige to its principals, 
the difference between de facto and de jure accountability is important (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001). 
In reality, although the NEITI prescribes the achievement of accountability in law, in reality it 
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has not achieved any accountability. As argued by Asgill (2012), there is no shortage of well-
crafted laws in Nigeria, the problem lies in implementing the laws. Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) 
also argue that enacting more laws and increasing the capacity of patrimonial governments will 
not lead to the achievement of impartiality enhancing institutions. Doing so will make 
patrimonial governments such as Nigeria become more powerful. Instead, it is more important to 
ensure that those who benefit from opaque transparency are punished. 
Consequently, the NEITI is mostly described as a “toothless bulldog” (Asgill, 2012:43). 
Disclosing information about oil companies is meaningless if there are no sanctions available.  In 
2012, the NEITI revealed that about US$8 billion was lost in potential tax payments and only 
about US$ 400 million was recovered (Nwapi, 2014). This revenue could have potentially been 
used to improve social and economic welfare in Nigeria. One can conclude that the NEITI 
focuses on one face of accountability, answerability only and not answerability that is 
accompanied by sanctions (Fox, 2010).  
The NEITI is given powers to sue in civil action only and this excludes the power initiate 
criminal prosecution (Ihugba, 2014). It is an Act of the National Assembly and is within the 
Attorney General’s jurisdiction to prosecute. This means that the NEITI Act uses soft law 
characterized by voluntary directives ((Ihugba, 2014). As of yet, no oil company has been 
prosecuted or had their license suspended by the NEITI based on an NEITI recommendation 
(Ihugba, 2014).  
Furthermore, there are oil companies which are yet to pay remedies but the NEITI has not been 
able to sanction or penalize them (Okeke & Aniche, 2011). Ultimately, the NEITI relies on the 
judiciary and EFCC to prosecute (Müller, 2010). As argued by Wilson and van Alstine (2014) 
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the soft law approach of the EITI limits positive spillover into institutions and this limits the 
likelihood of achieving accountability. The soft law approach is mostly ineffective and lacks the 
necessary buy-in from TNOCs (Oshionebo, 2018).  
Moreover, the EITI’s validation process is not enough as a means to sanction countries for non-
compliance. In 2011, Nigeria was designated as “close to compliant” based on inter alia a request 
for Nigeria to strengthen civil society participation. The “close to compliant” standard has the 
potential to become the norm for countries which do not meet EITI requirements. This does not 
give out a good message to other countries who do not comply with the EITI (Abutudu & 
Garuba, 2011). 
8.6.How Power Imbalances Feed into the Weaknesses of the NEITI: 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) attempts to address the secrecy clause of the NEITI Act of 
2007 (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The PIB aims to remove the secrecy around the payment of 
royalties, taxes, fees and bonuses. Furthermore, the PIB’s main objective is to consolidate all oil 
and gas laws that regulate the sector (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). Due to its wide ambition, the 
PIB was split into four parts, the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill, Petroleum Industry 
Administration Bill, Petroleum Industry Fiscal Bill and the Petroleum Host Community Bill. The 
Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB), a successor of the PIB, also aims to reduce the 
discretionary powers of the president and the petroleum minister to oversee the allocation and 
award of oil licensing (Carsten, 2018).   
The PIGB is a step in the right direction. However, the 10 year delay in passing the bill which 
has the potential to unlock investment in the oil sector makes one to question whether there is a 
true commitment to oil transparency and accountability reforms. The PIGB also exposes the 
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limitations of the state’s political will for reform (de Montclos, 2014). This also applies for the 
delay in the passing of the Freedom of Information Act (Gillies, 2009) by the House of 
Representatives.   
“Investors” are also ambivalent about the passing of the bill, arguing that the new bill will affect 
their profits due to higher tax and host community levies that are said to be introduced by the bill 
(Okoroafor, 2018). The bill aims to give host communities a direct 10% stake in oil investments 
and forces the NEITI to engage directly with them. Signing the bill will present positive changes 
to the oil industry.  
However, the alliance and dependent relationship between the state and TNOC’s also prevents a 
genuine commitment to achieve transparency and accountability because they have more to 
benefit from oil rents that come from the joint-ventures and the NNPC stake of downstream 
operations. The Nigerian state’s dependence on oil revenues, foreign technology and the 
volatility of global financial markets undermines its capacity to withstand pressures from TNOCs 
(Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). This leads one to conclude, that the Nigerian oil industry is 
characterized by power imbalances not only between the state and communities but between the 
state and TNOCs. Impartiality enhancing institutions that focus on counterbalancing existing 
power relations are thus necessary in Nigeria. For example, trade Unions in Nigeria have accused 
the state of amending the PIB several times to satisfy the interests of TNOCs (de Montclos, 
2014). About 56 of these amendments, proposed by members of the Lagos Chamber of 
Commerce Industries, disfavour ordinary Nigerians (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The American 
government is also said to have intervened on behalf of TNOCs.  
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Furthermore, the NEITI also does not address the problem of IFFs and the issue of tax havens 
(Asgill, 2012). Even though Nigeria is also one of the first countries to implement the beneficial 
ownership requirement to tax effectively as stipulated in the 2016 EITI standard through a 
publicly available register, it does not have the capacity to do so (Adeleke, 2017). One can 
conclude that the NEITI does not address the international infrastructure that provides a thriving 
environment for corruption (Asgill, 2012). The international system of corruption is reinforced 
by the lack of transparency in the TNOCs domicile country (Gillies, 2009). These domicile 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, refuse to adhere to the same guidelines and principles 
that are provided by the EITI and give TNOCs carte blanche on the atrocities they create in 
developing countries (Young, 2009). It is through these existing power imbalances between the 
Global North and the Global South that shifts the blame for underdevelopment and corruption to 
African Governments (Haufler, 2010).  
Moreover, the audits are also silent about the environmental impact of oil operations and the 
necessary compensation for it (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The explanation for this can be found 
in why transparency became the most supported solution for the resource curse and underscores 
that it is market-based solution (Gupta, 2010). The NEITI prioritizes economic transparency at 
the expense of political transparency which can lead to accountability. And hence the lack of a 
more authoritative sanctioning of companies and government officials (Fox, 2010).  
Power imbalances are central to the institutions curse (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a). They highlight 
the lack of impartiality enhancing institutions that allow corruption and a lack of accountability 
to thrive. Despite punishing rent-seeking politicians, Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) recommend that 
an independent and participative civil society are important to counter balance the power of those 
who benefit from a lack of transparency.  
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8.7.Civil Society Participation and Local Communities in the NEITI: 
The EITI criterion includes the need to provide space for civil society participation through a 
Multi-Stakeholder Initiative to actively design, monitor and evaluate the process. In Nigeria, the 
NSWG was established to adhere to this requirement (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The NSWG is 
responsible for policy formation and programme design through participation in the NEITI’s 
Civil Society Working Group Committee. CSOs also have a liaison officer within the NEITI 
secretariat who is responsible for monitoring the activities of the NEITI and reporting back to 
civil society’s constituency (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). 
CSOs have undertaken roadshows and media campaigns aimed at publicizing NEITI audit 
reports. CISLAC is one of such organization that has been actively participating in awareness 
campaigns (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The EITI sees civil society as having the potential to 
compensate for the EITI’s lack of enforcement by insisting on policies or sanctions outside of the 
NEITI structures through the mobilization of citizens to pressurize compliance to NEITI 
(Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). 
Through the creation of the NSWG, oil industry operators are more alert and more attention has 
been brought to oil theft issues. International support has also been mobilized to have an 
equivalent process akin to blood diamonds for oil. There is also more awareness around 
environmental impacts of oil such as oil spillage which consequently also now includes direct 
payments to citizens. Civil society is also in the process of advocating for 30% of the royalty fee 
to be paid directly to host communities (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). There are some positive 
outcomes for creating a NSGW. However, the NSGW is subject to scrutiny.  
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Structurally, the NEITI is critiqued because the NSWG is of the secretariat but not part of it. This 
creates a situation by which a government agency monitors another government agent and this 
can be seen as sabotage of its oversight role (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). Furthermore, civil 
society participation in the NEITI process is weak due to a lack of technical capacity to 
understand the information produced (Asgill, 2012).  
The ease of access to acquire the NEITI published information is also difficult and exacerbated 
by changing legal regimes that are subject to the president’s support of the anti-corruption 
agenda (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). This means that information is not costlessly obtained 
(Lindstedt & Nauren 2010). As argued by Lindstedt and Nauren (2010), the publication of 
information is not enough. If the Nigerian government is truly committed to the transparency and 
accountability agenda, it should attempt to bridge the data inequalities that arise because of class, 
race, gender, education, language and geography (Carter, 2014). This especially applies for 
Nigeria because their literacy rate is only 50.1% of its population and as argued by Lindstedt and 
Nauren (2010), the higher the education level, the stronger the capacity of people to access and 
understand information (UNDP, 2018).  
There is also a weak comprehension of NEITI reports due to a lack of expertise on the oil 
industry. This creates a knowledge gap which makes it difficult for CSOs to engage in debates 
about inter alia royalties, taxes and penalties (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The weakness in civil 
society capacity makes it difficult to publicize information which is an accountability condition 
(Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005). A weak civil society also has limited power to act on the 
information provided (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009b). 
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In addition, CSOs are also polarized and this leads to a lack of coordination and 
institutionalization. This means that CSOs in Nigeria also have a collection action problem 
(Asobie, n.d.). According to Asobie (n.d.), civil society is weakened by the fact that Nigeria’s 
social structure is characterized by a weak, factionalized and unpatriotic middle class and this 
hinders the creation of a sustainable opposition. Where there is lack of political competition, 
political transparency is even more difficult to achieve (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005).  
Another important critique about civil society participation in the NSWG is its independence 
which is hampered by government’s interference in the selection process of CSO representatives 
(Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The NSWG consists of 15 board members who are drawn from 
government, the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, TNOCs, civil society, labour unions and 
experts from the industry (Asgill, 2012). 
 One of the most contentious aspects about the NSWG is that individuals are elected by 
government and this is considered inconsistent with EITI principles (Asgill, 2012). The NEITI 
does not stipulate how representatives of the NSWG should be chosen and this leaves the 
president with too much discretion to choose representatives based on political considerations 
(Ejiogu et al., 2018). Furthermore, even if there was a stipulation for electing representatives, 
there are only three positions available for CSOs, trade unions and representatives from the 
extractive industry out of 15 board members. This leaves the extractive industry with majority 
representation in the NSWG and this means that it can easily meet the quorum of 8 without civil 
society (Ihugba, 2016). Ihugba (2016:214) asks a fundamental question about the NSWG, 
“National interest or that of extractive industry companies?”  
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The majority held by extractive companies in the NSGW creates the impression that they can set 
the rules and the framework of enforcement. This creates a situation where transparency is self-
imposed and will likely be less effective in achieving accountability (Lindstedt and Nauren, 
2010). This also creates a situation “where the persons who should be held accountable are the 
same persons providing the information and setting the standard, the independence of the process 
is thus doubtful” (Ihugba, 2016:216). Ihugba (2016) suggests that there is a need to change the 
quorum or composition of the NSWG.  
The current practice is to select representatives who are closely related to government or the 
ruling party. When the current president was elected, Muhammadu Buhari, there was hope that 
NSWG composition would change for the better. Instead, Buhari appointed the government 
minister for solid minerals as the new NEITI chair, a position that is usually reserved for a civil 
society member (Ejiogu et al., 2018). In addition, Buhari attempted to appoint civil society 
representatives without consulting with CSOs (Ejiogu et al., 2018). A Civil Society Steering 
Committee (CCSC) was created to increase the representation and involvement of CSOs but this 
does not address the underlying unequal power imbalances in the NSWG. In addition, the NEITI 
board does not publish any board, committee or working group minutes, a contradiction with the 
values it aims to promote (Ejiogu et al., 2018). The EITI MSI and its independence is one of its 
most important principles (Mainhardt-Gibbs, 2010; Sovacool et al., 2016). It requires effective 
participation of civil society (EITI, 2015). Currently, the fact that the EITI does not include 
minimum procedural guidelines for the composition of the MSI to enhance civil society and 
ensure that it is representative can be seen as problematic and it contradicts the requirement for 
impartiality enhancing institutions.  
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Furthermore, more attention is unfairly skewed to city-based CSOs that operate in Abuja or 
Lagos, neglecting the underfunded ones in host communities. Women, the youth, farmers and 
workers are ultimately excluded from participating in the NEITI (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). 
One can conclude that the NEITI also uses an “imagined community” by relying too much on 
national NGOs to represent local communities (Bracking, 2009). Furthermore, the power 
imbalances in the NSGW are apparent. 
Consequently, oil communities, at the heart of natural resource governance, are neglected and 
excluded from participatory processes (Abutudu & Garuba, 2011). The exclusion of local 
communities results in the lack of attention paid to local challenges. This means that local 
communities do not have any other alternative platform to express their concerns because 
Nigerian communities do not regard the national assembly and politicians as trust worthy 
(Abutudu & Garuba, 2011).  
The media is also an important intermediary to achieve accountability especially in countries that 
have weak institutions. However, in Nigeria, media houses are also part of a “sick alliance” with 
the state and private companies. Consequently, investigative journalists resort to self-censorship. 
As an implication, the public cannot access crucial information about the oil sector (Abutudu & 
Garuba, 2011). 
Since the independence of CSOs that participate in the NSWG is questionable, this means that 
the NEITI is unable to raise the voice and influence of those who are not included in the decision 
making structures of the oil industry and is unable to counter-balance the power of TNOCs and 
the Nigerian government. Therefore, the NEITI does not meet the standards of an impartiality 
enhancing institution (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a).  
Why is Transparency Not Enough to Address the Institutions Curse? 
A Case Study of Nigeria’s Implementation of the EITI. 
Page | 93 
 
As argued by this paper, the lack of civil society participation in the NSWG is largely 
attributable to the Nigerian context, a country that has an institutions curse (Ejiogu et al., 2018). 
It reemphasizes the persistent nature of bad institutions which cannot be altered through 
incremental change such as introducing transparency (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a). This means, that 
localizing transparency reforms, as suggested by scholars such as Ejiogu et al. (2018) and 
Adeleke (2017) might not be the answer either as long as their demand is not driven by local 
communities and civil society.  
9. Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations: 
This paper uses a case study of Nigeria to show that its underdevelopment is mostly caused by 
the mismanagement of its oil rents which is ultimately caused by its institutional context- the 
institutions curse. The institutions curse argues that power imbalances in decision making 
structures cause underdevelopment due to a lack of transparency and accountability.  
According to Kolstad and Wiig’s (2009a) theory on impartiality enhancing institutions, an 
empowered civil society has the potential to counter-balance the power of the state and TNOCs 
in Nigeria (Oshionebo, 2018). Furthermore, the sanctioning of those who benefit from opaque 
transparency, TNOCs and government officials, will alter institutional dynamics that breed 
corruption by fundamentally altering the incentives of local elites. The institutions curse shows 
us that developing countries like Nigeria have weak institutional and governance frameworks. 
Institutions are persistent and where bad institutions exist, they are difficult to change.  
The NEITI uses revenue transparency to counteract the institutions curse. However, the NEITI’s 
lack of enforcement and the lack of civil society independence and participation in its NSWG, 
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does not fundamentally alter the power imbalance that favours TNOCs and governments through 
transparency (Adeleke, 2017). NEITI is thus currently unable to meet the requirements of 
impartiality enhancing institutions. One can conclude that transparency, especially revenue 
transparency is not enough counteract the institutions curse.  
This leaves TNOCs, which have economic power, to influence the determination of taxes and 
royalties and to shape policy to maximize their profits (Oshionebo, 2018). There is a dependent 
relationship between governments and TNOCs which enables TNOCs to capture regulatory 
processes at the expense of the public. Their scaremongering to divest in the extractive sector of 
developing countries exacerbates this dependent relationship. Consequently, laws and remedies 
are rarely enforced against TNOCs as illustrated in Nigeria. This is also exacerbated by the lack 
of capacity as illustrated by the DPR and the NNPC (de Montclos, 2014). 
Therefore, this paper agrees with Kanzleiter & Becker (2018) and calls for the recognition of 
global human rights that will enable community struggles against TNOCs to be fought for 
outside and against institutions to create a link between local and international struggles 
(Kanzleiter & Becker, 2018). In the mining sector, global social rights will focus on 
environmental and human rights violations by TNOCs and government through an international 
and binding treaty alliance.  
Whilst TNOCs are afforded the opportunity to protect themselves through Investment Protection 
Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties on the international stage, they have no 
obligations imposed on them for the atrocities and crimes they commit in developing countries 
(Reckordt, 2018). The EITI, like the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, is 
voluntary and places no binding obligations on TNOCs. It should thus be seen as delaying efforts 
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to achieve a legally binding framework across the supply chain (Reckordt, 2018). The UN 
Binding treaty on Business and Human rights will connect struggles of communities against the 
government and companies to deal with these atrocities at the international level where local 
CSOs and local institutions of enforcement cannot. Future research should identify how an 
international binding treaty on business and human rights can alter power imbalances in the oil 
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